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Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams:
The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages
abstract. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
does not permit the imposition of punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm caused to
third parties. This Article critiques the reasoning, but seeks ultimately to vindicate the result, of
that landmark decision. It argues that, although the Court’s procedural due process analysis does
not stand up to scrutiny, punitive damages as punishment for third-party harm do indeed violate
procedural due process, but for reasons far more profound than those offered by the Court. To
reach that conclusion, the Article confronts the most basic and fundamental questions about
punitive damages—questions that the Supreme Court has studiously avoided for more than a
century: what, exactly, is the purpose of punitive damages, and how is it constitutional to
impose them as a form of punishment in a judicial proceeding without affording the defendant
the protection of the Constitution’s criminal procedural safeguards? The Article argues that
punitive damages are properly conceptualized as a form of punishment for private wrongs:
judicially sanctioned private revenge. As such, it makes both theoretical and doctrinal sense to
impose them without affording the defendant criminal procedural protections, which are
necessitated only for the punishment of public wrongs on behalf of society. When, however,
courts employ punitive damages as a form of punishment for public wrongs, they become a
substitute for the criminal law, which thus makes an intolerable end run around the Bill of
Rights. For that reason, Williams was ultimately correct that punitive damages must be limited
to punishment for the harm done to the individual plaintiff, not the harm done to the general
public. This reasoning suggests that contrary to the emerging conventional wisdom, Williams
does not stand in the way of the imposition of nonpunitive extracompensatory damages of the
type favored by law and economics scholars as a means of forcing the defendant to internalize the
costs of its behavior in order to achieve optimal deterrence.
author. Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. For helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article, the author would like to thank Michael Abramowicz,
Michael Allen, Judge Guido Calabresi, William Colby, David Fontana, Frederick Lawrence, Chip
Lupu, Dan Markel, Christopher Robinette, Shilpa Satoskar, Sheila Scheuerman, Anthony Sebok,
Catherine Sharkey, Jonathan Siegel, Peter Smith, Roger Trangsrud, Benjamin Zipursky, and the
participants in the work-in-progress workshop at The George Washington University Law
School.
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introduction
Recently, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,1 the Supreme Court held that
“the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties.”2 Williams is a revolutionary holding, and it was all but
unthinkable just a few years ago, when American courts—with the apparent
blessing of the Supreme Court—routinely awarded punitive damages to punish
the defendant for the harm that it caused to all of society, not just the harm
that it visited upon the individual plaintiff before the court. Indeed, it was that
phenomenon that was largely responsible for most of the headline-grabbing,
astronomical punitive damages awards of the past several decades.
Yet, for a path-breaking, five-to-four decision on a major constitutional
question, the Williams opinion is strangely terse and unreasoned. This Article
seeks to answer many of the questions raised by the Court’s cryptic and at
times misguided analysis, and to provide the theoretical defense of the Court’s
holding that is missing from its own opinion.
Part I explains how the Williams holding shattered the modern consensus
that punitive damages can and should be imposed to punish the defendant for
the full scope of the harm that it visited upon society. The Court reasoned that
it violates due process to punish a defendant for harming a large number of
people without demanding evidence relating to the particularities of each of
those injuries and without affording the defendant the opportunity to raise
individualized defenses. Part II exposes the Court’s reasoning as internally
inconsistent and insufficient to justify the result in the case.
Parts III and IV then seek to salvage Williams by explaining that punishing
the defendant for harm to nonparties does indeed violate the defendant’s
procedural due process rights, but for reasons much more profound than those
offered by the Court. That task necessitates paring the punitive damages
doctrine down to the conceptual bone. In two centuries of issuing punitive
damages decisions, the Supreme Court has never adequately answered the
most simple and fundamental of questions: What, exactly, are punitive
damages? What is their purpose? The Court has evaded those questions with
superficial platitudes that ultimately do nothing more than raise a different but
no less monumental question.

1.
2.

394

127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
Id. at 1063.
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The purpose of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has repeatedly told
us, is to punish and deter, like the criminal law.3 But if that is so, then a deeper
fundamental question looms: why are they constitutional? The Constitution
makes clear that those who face criminal punishment are entitled to an array of
procedural safeguards, including the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,4 the privilege against self-incrimination,5 and the right to be free from
double jeopardy,6 among others. The obvious objection to punitive damages is
that it seems clearly unconstitutional to punish a defendant with a sanction
that the Supreme Court concedes is conceptually and functionally
indistinguishable from a criminal punishment without affording the
procedural safeguards that the Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants.
That objection has plagued punitive damages for well over a century. Yet the
Supreme Court has never confronted it.7 Instead, the Court has consistently
sidestepped the issue with the assurance that punitive damages must be
constitutional because they predate the Constitution and the Framers
manifested no intention to displace them.
Part III explains that this evasion will not do, for it is based on a profound
misunderstanding of the historical purpose and function of punitive damages.
Historically, punitive damages were generally treated as punishment for
private wrongs to individuals, not public wrongs to society. History thus
provides no safe harbor for modern awards of punitive damages designed to
mimic the criminal law by punishing the defendant for the full scope of the
harm that it inflicted upon society.
As such, what the Williams Court failed to recognize is that the
constitutionality of awarding punitive damages for harm to nonparties cannot
be resolved without confronting the fundamental question head on: how is it
that punitive damages are constitutional? Part IV does just that. It concludes
that the Constitution necessitates criminal procedural safeguards only when a
sanction seeks to punish the defendant for a public wrong. Thus, punitive
damages are constitutional if they fulfill their historical role of punishing the

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
See id. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb . . . .”).
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 131 (2005)
(noting the Court’s longstanding “disinclination to engage the civil-criminal gestalt in
dealing with the applicability of constitutional criminal provisions” to punitive damages).
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defendant for the private wrong committed upon the individual plaintiff, but
they are unconstitutional in their (pre-Williams) recent incarnation as
punishment for the public wrong visited on society. In reaching this
conclusion, Part IV seeks to provide a sophisticated theoretical and
constitutional account of punitive damages as both sensible and permissible
punishment for the harm to the plaintiff, but not as punishment for the harm
to others. It argues that punitive damages are a form of legalized private
revenge—both theoretically and constitutionally distinct from the public
retribution and deterrence achieved through the criminal law. That is the true
justification for the result in Williams: punishing the defendant for the harm to
nonparties converts punitive damages into a criminal remedy, which the
Constitution will not tolerate in a civil proceeding.
Part V looks ahead. Despite some loose language that others have
interpreted as a debilitating loophole, Williams will, I assert, have a significant
effect on reducing massive punitive damages awards. There is a risk that its
impact will go too far, however, and result in the underdeterrence of harmful
behavior. Part V addresses the states’ ability to respond to that concern. Others
have suggested that Williams essentially constitutionalizes one of the many
rationales for punitive damages and forecloses the states from using punitive
damages to achieve ends other than private punishment—such as ensuring
efficient deterrence. In essence, they claim, Williams effectively serves as a
federal license for companies to misbehave, cause diffuse harm, and profit from
it.8 Part V rejects that claim by arguing that Williams does not constitutionalize
one particular vision or theory of punitive damages (punishment for private
wrongs) to the exclusion of all others; it simply provides that the Constitution
precludes one (and only one) particular vision or theory of punitive damages
(punishment for public wrongs—the prevailing modern theory). Williams thus
allows the states to address the underdeterrence concern by implementing the
recommendation of law and economics scholars to create a category of
extracompensatory damages designed to ensure optimal deterrence. Such
damages would not be a form of punishment, and thus—even though they
would seek to serve a purely public interest—they would not constitute
unconstitutional punishment for public wrongs. Once we take the punishment
out of punitive damages, as law and economics scholars have been urging us to
do for decades, we avoid the constitutional infirmity involved in Williams.

8.

396

See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of Punitive
Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 459, 494 (2008).
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i. the end of total harm punitive damages
In the decades leading up to Williams, punitive damages were, with
increasing frequency, awarded to punish the defendant for the total harm that
its wrongful conduct caused to all of society, not just the harm that it caused to
the actual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court9—a sweeping sanction that I
and others have referred to as “total harm” punitive damages.10 It was this
phenomenon that was largely responsible for most of the jaw-dropping
punitive damage awards in recent years. A jury that sees its mission as
inflicting an appropriate punishment for causing thousands, or even millions,
of injuries or deaths is likely to award punitive damages in an amount several
orders of magnitude greater than it would award if it understood its task much
more modestly as punishing the defendant for the wrong done only to the
single victim before the court. To take a particularly striking example, in 2002,
a California jury awarded a single smoker who contracted lung cancer
$850,000 in compensatory damages and $28 billion—billion!—in punitive
damages.11 That staggering punitive award was surely beyond the pale as
punishment for causing only the plaintiff’s illness and suffering; no rational
justice system could possibly mete out that kind of penalty for harming a single
person, no matter how severe the suffering and how reprehensible the
wrongdoing. But it was not necessarily unreasonable as punishment for the
harm done to the literally millions of smokers who were injured or killed by the
defendant’s fraud (if one concludes, as did the jury, that the tobacco company
was guilty of maliciousness in knowingly causing those countless deaths and
injuries). Plaintiff’s counsel drove home this very point in closing argument:
Less than 3,000 people died in the Twin Towers terrorist attack.
When I say ‘less than,’ that sounds really weird because what an
unbelievable human toll; but in the terms we are talking about here,
just so we can bring this down, that’s a 30-day toll in California alone
right now from smoking cigarettes.12

9.

10.

11.
12.

See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584-85 (2003); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 349-51 (2003).
See, e.g., Colby, supra note 9, at 587; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-ThanWhole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117, 127
(2003); Rachel M. Janutis, Reforming Reprehensibility: The Continued Viability of Multiple
Punitive Damages After State Farm v. Campbell, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1465, 1466 n.2 (2004).
See Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 151 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 163 n.19.
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Awards of total harm punitive damages, including many in the multimillions of dollars, were commonplace in the years leading up to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Williams.13 The Williams case itself is typical of the
phenomenon. Plaintiff Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris for causing the
death of her husband, who died of lung cancer after many years of smoking
Philip Morris cigarettes. In closing arguments, Williams’s lawyer urged the
jury to punish Philip Morris not only for the harm caused to her husband, but
also for the harm visited upon all of the thousands of other smokers in the state
who had been injured by smoking Philip Morris cigarettes.14 The jury
apparently complied, awarding Williams $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the jury’s award because Philip Morris’s
conduct “caused a significant number of deaths each year in Oregon”15 and, it
concluded, there is nothing unconstitutional about “using punitive damages to
punish a defendant for harm to nonparties.”16
A decade ago, the Supreme Court of the United States seemingly agreed
with that proposition. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court held
that federalism concerns preclude a state court from using punitive damages to
punish a defendant for harm caused to out-of-state victims, at least where the
defendant’s conduct was legal in the other state,17 but the Court clearly, albeit
implicitly, endorsed the notion that there is nothing wrong with allowing the
jury to punish the defendant for the harm caused to all in-state victims, even
those not before the court.18 That suggestion accorded with a consensus among
courts and commentators that punitive damages are intended to serve as
punishment for public wrongs—wrongs to society—and therefore should be

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

398

See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 350-51.
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2, Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256).
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1170, 1175 (Or. 2006) (quoting Williams v.
Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 839 (Or. 2002)).
Id. at 1175.
517 U.S. 559, 570-74 (1996). The Court subsequently extended that holding to preclude a
state from punishing a defendant even for unlawful out-of-state conduct. See State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003).
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 & n.35 (evaluating whether the punitive damages award was
excessive as punishment for the harm done to all of the in-state victims, rather than the
harm done to the plaintiff alone); see also Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive
Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 25 n.112 (2004); Colby, supra note
9, at 603-04 & n.66.
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calibrated by reference to the full scope of harm that the defendant’s conduct
visited upon all of society.19
I took issue with that consensus in a 2003 article that concluded, based on
an analysis of the origins and early evolution of punitive damages, that punitive
damages historically were understood to serve as punishment for private
wrongs to individuals, rather than as punishment for public wrongs to
society.20 Given that history, I argued that, “to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, all punitive damages awards must be designed (and limited to the
amount necessary) to punish the defendant only for the wrong done, and the
harm caused, to the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court.”21
Shortly after the publication of that article, the Supreme Court issued a
cryptic opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, in
which it remarked that a “defendant should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to
adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a
defendant.”22 Several courts and commentators interpreted Campbell as
reversing course 180 degrees and precluding punishment for harm to
nonparties.23 Drawing upon other seemingly contradictory passages in the

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Colby, supra note 9, at 586, 603-06 (describing this consensus, which emerged without
reason or explanation over the last several decades).
See id. at 613-43.
Id. at 591.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423; see also id. (“Nor does our review of the Utah courts’ decisions
convince us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the Campbells.”).
See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004); Guido
Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW
333, 345-46 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005); Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (2005) (observing that the Court “effectively recognized that
punitive damages must punish private wrongs . . . and not the public wrong”); Zipursky,
supra note 7, at 144 n.209. The California Court of Appeal, for instance, took the position
that “Campbell . . . essentially adopted the narrow view of punitive damages Professor Colby
had articulated in his law review article appearing in print shortly before the Supreme Court
decided Campbell.” Allen, supra note 18, at 25-26 n.112 (discussing Romo v. Ford Motor Co.,
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003)); see Romo, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 801 (“State Farm, in our
view, impliedly disapproved this broad view of the goal and measure of punitive damages.
Instead, as a matter of due process under the federal Constitution, the court adopted the
more limited, historically based view of punitive damages.” (citing Colby, supra note 9, at
667-73)); see also Galligan, supra note 10, at 126 & n.53. In Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d
82 (Cal. 2005), the California Supreme Court partially rejected the California Court of
Appeal’s conclusion. See id. at 92 (“The Romo court’s analysis does not convince us that the
United States Supreme Court, in State Farm, adopted wholesale the ‘historical’ view of
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Campbell opinion, however, other commentators interpreted the case much
more narrowly—as breaking no new ground and in no way precluding
punishment for harm to nonparties.24 Due to the inscrutability of the Campbell
decision, the constitutionality of total harm punitive damages had been called
into question but remained uncertain.
Williams put an end to the uncertainty. The Court declared that, although
it had not squarely decided either in favor of the constitutionality of total harm
punitive damages in BMW, or against their constitutionality in Campbell, it
was now prepared to resolve the issue: “We did not previously hold explicitly
that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold
now.”25
ii. procedure, substance, and the inadequacy of williams
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 like its
counterpart in the Fifth Amendment,27 protects two distinct categories of
rights, generally referred to as rights of “procedural” and “substantive” due
process.28 The Clause is most naturally read to “requir[e] the government to
follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to ‘deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property.’”29 This is the concept of procedural due process,
which is typically concerned with giving fair notice and a fair hearing before
the government deprives individuals of their liberty or property.30 But the
Clause has long been interpreted to extend further to “bar[] certain

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

400

punitive damages outlined in the Colby article as a constitutional rule binding on the
states.” (citation omitted)).
Some commentators interpreted Campbell as forbidding only punishment for dissimilar acts
that harmed third parties. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need To
Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages’ Cases,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 521-22 (2004). Other commentators interpreted Campbell as forbidding
only punishment for out-of-state harm. See, e.g., Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards
and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1114, 1128 (2004).
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545 (3d ed.
2006).
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 545.
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government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.”31 This is the concept of substantive due process, which is
concerned with preventing governmental oppression32 and with protecting
fundamental rights from governmental interference.33
A. Was the Williams Court’s Purported Reliance on Procedural Due Process
Just a Ruse?
In Williams, the Court purported to ground its holding in the doctrine of
procedural due process, rather than its much-maligned substantive cousin.34
The Court’s motivation for doing so is easy to explain: as it has reiterated
many times, “the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process.”35 Substantive due process, with its nominally
oxymoronic nature and its dubious history of judicial overreaching, is the black
sheep of constitutional rights. It operates in the murky shadows of Lochner v.
New York,36 the poster child for the evils of “judicial activism.” Partially
ashamed of the substantive due process doctrine’s very existence, the Court
often struggles mightily to keep it confined to those shadows, out of the light
of public and academic scrutiny. The United States Reports are full of landmark
cases in which the Supreme Court, seeking to deflect comparisons to Lochner,
has gone to drastic—sometimes ludicrous—lengths to avoid explicit reliance on
substantive due process.37 As David Bernstein explains, “The ghost of Lochner

31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
See id.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992). While the notion of
“substantive due process” might sound linguistically awkward to contemporary ears, it in
fact has a very long historical pedigree in our law. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995).
See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2004) (“[W]e need now only consider the Constitution’s
procedural limitations.”).
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005) (discussing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Tamar Ezer, A
Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 22 (2004) (discussing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due
Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 739 (2002) (discussing the Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After
Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (2001) (discussing the Court’s family privacy

401

392.COLBY.479.DOC

the yale law journal

12/22/2008 1:18:43 PM

118:392

2008

v. New York haunts American constitutional law. . . . Supreme Court Justices
are at pains to deny that their opinions declaring laws unconstitutional are
Lochnerian, while dissenting Justices use Lochner as an epithet to criticize their
colleagues.”38 And when it comes to cases involving economic rights—such as,
arguably, the right to be free from excessive punitive damages—the analogy to
Lochner is disturbingly acute. Whenever the Court invokes the substantive due
process doctrine to limit punitive damages, impassioned cries of Lochnerism
inevitably follow.39
As such, the Court has always felt more comfortable imposing procedural
due process limits on punitive damages than substantive ones. The Court has
held, for instance, that procedural due process affords the defendant the right
to judicial review of the size of the punitive damage award,40 and the right to
de novo appellate review of the trial court’s determination that the award was
not excessive.41 In so holding, the Court has “strongly emphasized the
importance of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause” in the
realm of punitive damages.42
Some of the Court’s punitive damages decisions, however, have gone
beyond the realm of fair process to impose substantive constitutional limits on
the size of punitive damages awards. And yet, so afraid is the Court of the
ghost of Lochner that it has attempted to mask those substantive decisions in
procedural garb.
Prior to its 1996 decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court
had implied the existence of due process limits on the size of punitive damages
awards, and it had explicitly suggested in dicta that those limits were grounded
in substantive due process,43 but it had never actually struck down an award of

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

402

opinions); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: The Elysian Fields of the Law,
57 STAN. L. REV. 695, 706-07 (2004) (discussing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942));
Richard G. Wilkins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 525, 546-47
(1992) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist
Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1052-53 (2005) (book review).
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1991)
(declaring that “‘it is not disputed that a jury award [of punitive damages] may not be
upheld if . . . it was reached in proceedings lacking the elements of fundamental
fairness’”(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
276 (1989))).
See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54
(1993).
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punitive damages on those grounds. When, in BMW, the Court finally did
strike down a punitive award as unconstitutionally excessive, it suddenly
became cagey about just which component of the Due Process Clause formed
the basis for its holding. The majority opinion never invoked the phrase
“substantive due process”; it simply found a “due process” violation.44 Indeed,
the majority opinion eschewed the word “substantive” altogether.45 Instead, in
declaring the award unconstitutionally excessive, the Court emphasized that
“[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a person receive fair notice . . .
of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose,” and ultimately held
that, because “BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the
sanction that Alabama might impose,” the punitive damages award was
“grossly excessive.”46 The requirement of adequate notice is, of course,
traditionally associated with procedural due process, not substantive due
process.47
This nominal reliance in BMW on procedural concepts was, however,
illusory. Nearly the entirety of the Court’s analysis was concerned with
whether the award was “grossly excessive in relation to” the “State’s legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”48—a
quintessentially substantive inquiry.49 If the state had previously enacted a law
publicly declaring that any company that commits a tort like the one
committed by BMW can be punished by punitive damages in an amount up to
$1 billion—thus taking the issue of inadequate notice off the table—it is hard to
believe that the Court’s decision would have come out any differently. The
Court’s real problem with the punitive damages award in BMW was that it was

44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 568 (1996); see Michael J. Phillips, The
Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 471 n.110 (1998).
See Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L.
79, 93 n.96 (2005).
BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462-63 (noting that an argument that the defendant “had no advance
notice that the jury might be allowed to return such a large award” of punitive damages is an
argument “that the punitive damages award is the result of a fundamentally unfair
procedure”); Paul M. Sykes, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive
Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1084, 1113 (1997).
517 U.S. at 568 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 456).
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) (citing
BMW for the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on the
imposition of “grossly excessive” punitive damages awards).
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too large, not that it was unexpected.50 Indeed, both of the dissents in BMW
explicitly characterized the majority’s evasive opinion as grounded in
substantive due process,51 and the majority was unwilling or unable to directly
take issue with that characterization.
Seven years later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, when the Court struck down an award of punitive damages as
unconstitutionally excessive for a second time, it again paid lip service to the
procedural notion of inadequate notice, and it again failed to acknowledge
explicitly that it was relying on substantive due process.52 Yet it was again
unwilling or unable to disagree with the dissenting opinions’ characterization
of its holding as grounded in substantive due process.53
It would appear that the Court’s choice to couch its substantive decisions in
BMW and Campbell in procedural terms was the product of a defensive and not
particularly convincing effort to ward off comparisons to Lochner.54 After all,
there is nothing controversial or arguably oxymoronic about procedural due
process, and a vigorous protection of procedural rights, even in economic cases,
does not invite unwelcome analogies to the Lochner era.
Given that the Court had been ashamed of its reliance on substantive due
process in the cases leading up to Williams and had gone to such extremes to
disguise it, it is not surprising that it sought to couch its Williams holding in
procedural terms as well. And it is equally unsurprising that the dissenting
Justices did not believe a word of it. “It matters not,” wrote Justice Thomas,
“that the Court styles today’s holding as ‘procedural,’ because the ‘procedural’
rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process

50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
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See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86 (“[W]e are fully convinced that the grossly excessive
award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit.”); id. at 575 n.24 (relying on
the “principle that punishment should fit the crime”).
See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
See id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Zipursky, supra note 7, at 117-18 (“[Justice Stevens] apparently felt pressure to tie the
striking down of damages under the Due Process Clause to a familiar procedural concept:
‘notice.’ . . . And yet little or none of the analysis that follows addresses the issue of notice, at
least not in any clear way.”).
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regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”55 Commentators have
tended to agree.56
The majority opinion does, indeed, read in places as though the claimed
reliance on procedural due process was simply window dressing for what was
in reality a substantive decision. The opinion can be read to suggest that the
Court believed the “procedural” due process violation to be the trial court’s
failure either to issue the defendant’s requested instruction to the jury to
punish only for the harm done to the plaintiff57 or to implement alternative
procedures capable of ensuring that the defendant would not be punished for
the harm to third parties.58 It is surely true that the failure to issue a requested
jury instruction can be thought of as a procedural due process violation.59 In
circumstances like these, however, doing so only confuses the issue. The failure
to give a jury instruction can violate due process only if the defendant has an
underlying right to the limitation that the instruction seeks to place upon the
jury. That underlying right could be a procedural one, but it could also be a
substantive one. For instance, the failure to give an acceptable reasonable doubt
instruction in a criminal trial violates procedural due process,60 but that is
because a criminal defendant has a procedural due process right to a

55.

56.

57.
58.

59.

60.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for boldly “announc[ing] its new
rule of substantive law” and for failing to heed the Court’s traditional reluctance to expand
the substantive due process doctrine).
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 18 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, at xi, xii (2007) (describing Williams as a substantive due process case);
F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals
Without Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 355-56 (2008); Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony
J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After Philip Morris v.
Williams, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 7 n.28, 54, on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071073; Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke:
Feb.
21,
2007,
The
Supreme
Court
Loses
Its
Unanimity,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/id/2160286 (describing the majority’s invocation of procedural due
process as a “legal fig leaf” to cover what was really an indefensible use of substantive due
process).
See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (“It is constitutionally important for a court to provide
assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one.”).
See id. at 1065 (“Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of
procedures they will implement [to protect against punishment for harm to third parties],
federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in appropriate
cases.”).
See, e.g., Andrew C. Jayne, The Impact of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Punitive Damages
Jurisprudence on Oklahoma’s Punitive Damages Statute and Jury Instructions, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
873, 888 (2004).
See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
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heightened standard of proof.61 By contrast, the failure to instruct a jury that,
for instance, it must find actual malice before imposing liability on a
newspaper for defaming a public official might also be thought of as a
procedural due process violation, insofar as an important procedural
safeguard—a jury instruction that conforms to the Constitution—was ignored.
But the missing instruction was warranted only because the defendant has a
substantive free speech right (imposed by the First Amendment and
incorporated against the states through substantive due process) to make false
statements about the official conduct of public officials in the absence of actual
malice.62 In such circumstances, the failure to properly charge the jury in reality
constitutes a denial of a substantive right, not a procedural one.63
The focus on the failure to give the proper jury instruction thus obscures
the question of whether Williams was truly grounded in procedural or
substantive due process. What ultimately matters is the constitutional source of
the underlying right sought to be protected by that instruction—the right not
to be punished for the harm done to third parties through an award of punitive
damages.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens labeled this new right a “rule of substantive
law.”64 He did not articulate a basis for that assertion, but there was in fact
good reason for it. When the Court previously hinted in Campbell that it might
find a constitutional problem with total harm punitive damages, it implied that
the constitutional infirmity was a matter of substantive due process. It intimated
that the reason why “[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims
against a defendant” is that “[p]unishment on these bases creates the
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.”65
Unjust multiple punishment for the same conduct is generally understood to
be a substantive due process problem—a concern that the piling on will result
in excessive cumulative punishment.66 It was this substantive concern that
seemed to be motivating the Court in Campbell when it first suggested the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394-97 (1967) (finding a First Amendment violation—
not a procedural due process violation—in the failure to issue an actual malice instruction).
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Tex. 1998) (opining
that at some “point multiple punitive damages awards arising from the same course of
conduct are unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process”).
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possibility that the Constitution mandates that punitive damages cannot be
used to punish the defendant for harm caused to third parties.
But if it was this fear of excessive multiple punishment that motivated the
Williams Court—if the dissenters are right that the Court’s decision was
actually grounded in substantive due process—then the Court’s holding is
virtually indefensible. If the constitutional infirmity of total harm punitive
damages is a substantive one, based on the fact that multiple awards of them
can lead to excessive punishment, then they can be unconstitutional only when
they are awarded more than once; a single award of total harm punitive
damages that accurately punishes the defendant for the full scope of harm
caused by its wrongful conduct is not unconstitutionally excessive.67
In other words, the fear of excessive multiple punishment does not
automatically and categorically amount to a substantive due process violation.
Rather, the potential for multiple punishment crosses the threshold of
unconstitutionality as a matter of substantive due process only when it leads to
actual excessive multiple punishment. Whether that threshold has been crossed
in any given case depends on the individual circumstances of that case: the size
of the award, the size of the prior awards for the same conduct, whether the
jury or the judge has adequately adjusted the current award to take into
account the prior awards, and other such factors.
Yet the Court’s decision in Williams was categorical. The Williams Court
expressly declined to reach the question whether the actual amount of punitive
damages awarded to the plaintiff was unduly excessive;68 it held only that,
regardless of the amount, the punitive award was inherently unconstitutional
because it was born of an attempt to punish the defendant for harm to
nonparties. Indeed, it would have been virtually nonsensical for the Court to
strike down the punitive award in Williams on multiple punishment grounds,
given that no allegation was made that the defendant had ever been punished
in prior cases for the same wrongful conduct. There had been no multiple
punishment at all.
The substantive due process argument is thus untenable. Accordingly,
when the Williams Court claimed that it was relying on procedural due process,
it must have really meant it (unless its holding was utterly unsupportable).
This time, unlike with BMW and Campbell, the accusations of improperly

67.
68.

See Colby, supra note 9, at 658-66.
See 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (“[W]e shall not decide whether the award here at issue is ‘grossly
excessive.’”). BMW and Campbell, by contrast, had found that, even in the absence of
multiple punishments, the actual amounts of punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff
were unconstitutionally excessive. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 412, 429; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
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smuggling substantive due process constraints in procedural dressing miss the
mark.
B. The Williams Court’s Inadequate Basis for Finding a Procedural Due Process
Violation
But was there really a procedural due process violation?69 According to the
Court, punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates procedural due
process for two reasons. First, it denies the defendant the opportunity to
present individualized defenses with regard to those nonparties; and second, it
raises the risk of arbitrariness in the amount of punitive damages because the
generalized evidence at trial will not allow the jury to determine precisely the
number of victims or the extent or circumstances of their injuries.70

69.

70.
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Along the lines of the jury instruction point just discussed, one could argue that it violates
procedural due process to fail to institute some sort of procedural safeguard designed to
protect against substantively excessive multiple punishment. See Scheuerman & Franze,
supra note 56, at 7 n.28, 54; cf. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961)
(noting that a property owner “is deprived of due process of law if he is compelled to
relinquish [his property] without assurance that he will not be held liable again . . . in a suit
brought by a claimant who is not bound by the first judgment”). In other words, one could
argue that even if there was no substantive due process violation on the particular facts of
this case, there is an inherent procedural due process violation in the failure to systematically
protect against substantive due process violations in cases of this sort. But even if such a
failure is itself best viewed as a procedural, rather than a substantive, due process violation,
it is difficult to see how it could have formed the basis of the Court’s decision in Williams. In
Oregon—the state from which the Williams case arose—statute “requires a jury to consider
evidence of punishments already imposed on the defendant when it considers the amount of
an award of punitive damages.” Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 142 (Or. Ct.
App. 2004). Thus, according to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court’s “concern
in [Campbell] about multiple punitive damages awards that would be excessive in total is
ameliorated by Oregon law.” Id. Whether the requirement to inform the jury of prior
awards would indeed be adequate in most cases to ameliorate the potential for multiple
punishments to produce substantively excessive awards is certainly debatable. But the
Supreme Court in Williams never expressly found this procedural safeguard to be
inadequate; indeed, it never discussed it at all. And it would have been highly problematic
for the Court to base its decision on these grounds without some showing that the Oregon
law in practice has not succeeded in protecting against excessive cumulative punishment. A
case in which the Oregon procedural safeguard had not yet even had the opportunity to
come into play is hardly the proper vehicle for striking that safeguard down as
constitutionally inadequate. One would think that the Court would do so only in a
subsequent case in which a jury awarded a massive amount of punitive damages despite
having been informed of a prior monumental verdict.
See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
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As I have previously argued in some detail, these concerns are very real, and
they pose a serious risk of unfairness to the defendant in cases of this sort. It
can be profoundly unfair to require a defendant to pay punitive damages for
wronging thousands of individuals in the absence of evidence sufficient to
show that it did, in fact, commit legal wrongs against each of those third
parties and without giving it a meaningful chance to defend against those
alleged third-party claims.71 Still, the Court was too hasty in concluding that
these arguments are sufficient in themselves to establish a procedural due
process violation.72
Let us first consider the Court’s secondary concern that “to permit
punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless
dimension to the punitive damages equation.”73 The Court asked,
How many such victims are there? How seriously were they injured?
Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to
speculate. And the fundamental due process concerns to which our
punitive damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and
lack of notice—will be magnified.74
It is undeniably true that concerns for judicial economy would ordinarily
preclude the parties from introducing at trial detailed and individualized
evidence as to the specific circumstances of each of the numerous nonparty
victims’ injuries. But why does punishment in the absence of such evidence rise
to the level of a procedural due process violation? That is the key question, and
the Court had nothing to say about it; it simply assumed the conclusion—and a
questionable one at that. The plaintiff would surely be required, at a minimum,
to bring in credible evidence (perhaps in the form of expert testimony or
statistical studies) establishing the likely number of victims and the severity of
the average injury. Our law has long accepted the fact that even in the criminal
law—where due process concerns are at their apex—the magnitude of a
sentence for harming large numbers of persons can be calculated through just

71.
72.
73.
74.

See Colby, supra note 9, at 592-602, 650-57.
This was a question on which I had reserved judgment in my prior article. See id. at 602.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.
Id.
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this type of approximation.75 How can it violate due process to calculate civil
punitive damages in the same manner?
That leaves the Court’s primary concern: that punishing for harm to third
parties unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of the opportunity to present
individualized defenses related to the alleged nonparty victims. Using the facts
of Williams itself as an example, the Court explained that Philip Morris might
not actually be liable for many of the harms to other smokers for which it was
punished, because many of the other smokers likely did not rely on its
fraudulent statements or were fully aware of the dangers of smoking. Those
smokers may have been injured by Philip Morris’ products, but they were not
defrauded by its actions; Philip Morris was not legally responsible for their
injuries, and thus there was no warrant for punishing Philip Morris for having
wrongfully harmed them. Yet Philip Morris had no opportunity at trial to
establish these defenses for each individual victim; there were countless
thousands of smokers in Oregon, each of whom had a separate story to tell,
and none of whom (except Mr. Williams, through his wife) was before the
court to tell it. For this reason, the Court held that Philip Morris was denied its
right to due process when the jury punished it for the harm that its products
caused to every single in-state smoker.76
In the same breath, however, the Court qualified its holding that the
defendant cannot be punished for the harm caused to third parties by declaring
that the plaintiff can still introduce evidence of such harm, because the fact that
others were also harmed shows that the defendant’s conduct was particularly
reprehensible and warranted higher punitive damages.77 As Anthony Sebok
explains, this exception is fundamentally inconsistent with the majority’s
rationale for its primary rule:
The problem with the plaintiff’s jury instructions in Philip Morris,
according to the Court, was that they allowed the jury to decide
whether the defendant had legally harmed smokers who had not sued
and whose cases were not properly presented to the jury. But how

75.

76.
77.
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See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (“A reasonable estimate of
the loss [to the many victims] is all that is necessary [to calculate the sentence].”); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4 n.2 (2007); see also id. § 2B1.1 n.3(C) (providing
that the fine for corporate fraud is calculated by estimating “[t]he approximate number of
victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim,” and can even be based on “[m]ore
general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense and revenues generated by
similar operations”).
See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1063-64.
See id. at 1064.
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could that problem be cured by an instruction that allowed the jury to
enhance its punishment of the defendant for what it did to the plaintiff
on the basis of its conduct towards others? Wouldn’t that require
making a judgment about hypothetical cases—e.g., cases that involved
claims of legal wrongs by the defendant in relation to persons who
were not part of the case?78
Given the exception, the Court’s asserted rationale for its decision—that there
is a procedural due process deficiency in calibrating punishment by reference to
the harm to third parties in the absence of individualized evidence and defenses
related to those third parties—cannot explain or justify the Court’s holding.
More importantly—even leaving aside the contradiction between the
announced exception and the articulated rationale for the rule—the Court’s
central assertion that it is unconstitutional to punish a defendant for harm to
third parties without affording it the opportunity to raise individualized
defenses is subject to a foundational objection. Justice Stevens argued in
dissent that there was no need to provide Philip Morris with the opportunity to
establish defenses related to the peculiarities of other smokers’ claims because
Philip Morris was not being ordered to compensate those other smokers. “To
award compensatory damages to remedy such third-party harm might well
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due process,”
explained Justice Stevens.79 “But a punitive damages award, instead of serving
a compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution
and deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction.”80 Compensatory
damages are designed to redress individual wrongs, and therefore the
defendant cannot be ordered to pay them without being afforded the
opportunity to present every defense that it has to each of those individual
allegations of wrongdoing. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are, like
criminal sanctions, designed to punish and deter. They have nothing to do
with the private, individual wrongs done to the nonparties; rather, they punish
the defendant for the public wrong done to all of society. As Justice Stevens
argued, “Whereas compensatory damages are measured by the harm the
defendant has caused the plaintiff, punitive damages are a sanction for the
public harm the defendant’s conduct has caused or threatened.”81

78.
79.
80.
81.

Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 999 (2007)
(footnote omitted).
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Justice Stevens is surely right that there is no due process problem with
punishing the defendant for the harm that it did to society as a whole without
affording individualized defenses for each and every victim. That is why the
criminal law permits a sentence to be calculated on the basis of a rough
approximation of the number of people harmed and the average harm to each
victim.82 When punishing public wrongs, the judicial system does not care
whether the defendant would be liable to each and every one of its alleged
victims in tort. It cares only that the defendant engaged in reprehensible
conduct and that society suffered as a result. There is no constitutional
obligation to calibrate the degree of societal harm with individualized
precision.
Justice Stevens’s argument thus cannot easily be dismissed. If, as Justice
Stevens claims, punitive damages punish public wrongs—if he is correct that
they are essentially a form of “criminal sanction”83—then a defendant that is
forced to pay a rough approximation of total harm punitive damages generally
cannot claim that it has been denied the opportunity to present its defenses. It
had every opportunity to defend not only against the plaintiff’s claim that it
committed a private wrong (and was thus liable for compensatory damages),
but also against the plaintiff’s claim that it committed a public wrong (and was
thus liable for punitive damages), and it lost on both accounts. In Williams
itself, Philip Morris was in no way hindered from presenting a defense against
the allegation that it “acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with a
conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others”—the Oregon
standard for liability for punitive damages.84 The jury did not buy it; it found,
notwithstanding Philip Morris’s vigorous defense, that Philip Morris had
committed a malicious or reckless wrong upon society that caused or
threatened significant harm to the public. It was only after that defense failed
that Philip Morris was forced to pay the punitive damages for which the jury
found it liable. And those damages were, by definition, designed to punish it
for the full scope of the harm that its public wrong caused or threatened to
society. As Justice Stevens noted,
[T]here is no reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment
for engaging in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous and
addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide

82.
83.
84.
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See supra note 75.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1997) (currently codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730 (2007)).
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should not include consideration of the harm to those “bystanders” as
well as the harm to the individual plaintiff.85
The majority’s reasoning makes sense only if—contrary to Justice Stevens’s
assertion—punitive damages are not a form of punishment for public wrongs
to society.86 For the majority to be correct, Justice Stevens must be incorrect in
asserting that the award of punitive damages against Philip Morris was
properly intended to serve as “a sanction for the public harm the defendant’s
conduct has caused.”87 But Justice Stevens was not going out on a limb in
making that assertion. To the contrary, he was simply echoing the
conventional judicial wisdom that punitive damages “serve as punishment for
what amounts to a public wrong”88—punishment “for the wrong committed
upon society.”89 As one court recently commented, “The plaintiff remains a
party, but the de facto party is our society, and the jury is determining whether
and to what extent we as a society should punish the defendant.”90 Indeed, just
four years before Williams, the Supreme Court itself had declared that punitive
damages “serve the same purposes as criminal penalties,”91 the very raison d’être
of which is, of course, to punish public wrongs on behalf of society.92
The Williams majority never directly took issue with the conventional
wisdom that punitive damages are punishment for public wrongs. In fact, in

85.
86.

87.
88.

89.

90.
91.
92.

Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If—contra Justice Stevens—punitive damages punish private wrongs, not public ones, then
the Williams majority’s constitutional reasoning makes perfect sense. As I have previously
explained, it is surely unconstitutional to punish a defendant for a series of individual,
private, tortious wrongs without providing evidence that it did indeed commit each alleged
private wrong, and without affording the defendant the opportunity to raise individualized
defenses for each alleged wrong. See Colby, supra note 9, at 650-57.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Wayne A. Logan,
Civil and Criminal Recidivists: Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609,
1610 (2005) (“[L]ike criminal sanctions, punitive damages have come to be viewed as a
means to address ‘public wrongs’ . . . .”).
Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1991). This was the explicit
understanding of the Oregon courts, which helps to explain why the Oregon Supreme
Court in Williams did not see a problem with punishing the defendant for harm to
nonparties. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1243 (Or. 2002) (“Oregon courts
view[] the punitive and deterrent effect of punitive damages as vindicating interests of
society in general, and not of any plaintiff in particular.”).
Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145 (Ohio 2002).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
See infra Section IV.A.
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declaring that the plaintiff can still introduce evidence of third-party harm, the
majority seemed implicitly to agree that punitive damages vindicate the public
interest by punishing public wrongs. The Court explained that “[e]vidence of
actual harm to nonparties” is admissible because it “can help to show that the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the
general public.”93 Indeed, declared the Court, even when third parties were not
actually harmed, a larger award of punitive damages is justified when the
defendant’s conduct “nonetheless posed a grave risk [of harm] to the public.”94
Those statements seem to imply that the purpose of a punitive damages award
is to redress the wrong to society by punishing the defendant for the harm that
it caused—or threatened to cause—to the general public.
The majority opinion thus gives the appearance of theoretical incoherence.
The Court’s exception is inconsistent with the announced rationale for its rule.
And more fundamentally, the conclusion that due process is violated if the
defendant is punished for harm to third parties without being able to introduce
individualized defenses is dependent on the predicate notion that punitive
damages are a form of individualized sanction, rather than a form of
punishment for public wrongs; yet the Court reached that conclusion in an
opinion that elsewhere suggests that punitive damages are indeed punishment
for the harm to the public—for public wrongs.
The Court’s reasoning was thus insufficient to justify its holding that
punishing the defendant for harm to nonparties violates procedural due
process. In fact, that holding cannot be defended without confronting the
distinction between public and private wrongs that appears to have eluded the
Court. Parts III and IV aim to salvage the Court’s holding by doing just that.
iii. past: punitive damages as punishment for private
wrongs
I have previously developed in great detail an argument that, historically,
punitive damages—when they were used as a form of genuine punishment—
served as punishment for private, rather than public, wrongs.95 Nineteenthcentury courts were quite explicit in holding that “the damages allowed in a

93.
94.

95.
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Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007).
Id.; see also id. (approving of the Oregon Supreme Court’s observation that the “‘jury could
consider whether Williams and his misfortune were merely exemplars of the harm that
Philip Morris was prepared to inflict on the smoking public at large’” (quoting Williams v.
Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (Or. 2006))).
See Colby, supra note 9, at 613-43.
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civil case by way of punishment[] have no necessary relation to the penalty
incurred for the wrong done to the public,” but rather are imposed “as a
punishment for the wrong done to the individual.”96 Thus, nineteenth-century
case law “makes the distinction between the punishment for the wrong done
the public, for which the punishment is inflicted in the criminal action, and
that done to the individual, for which punishment may be imposed by the jury
in the civil action.”97 As one court explained, “Considered as strictly punitory,
the damages are for the punishment of the private tort, not of the public
crime.”98 As such, an individual victim was not permitted to punish the
defendant for the harm done to society or to nonparties.99
Of course, punitive damages have evolved since then. They have come to
serve the very different purpose of punishing public wrongs. Justice Stevens
was correct in noting that total harm punitive damages—as punishment for
public wrongs—are now the norm (or at least they were before the Court
perfunctorily struck them down in Williams). But I intend to establish here
that, when punitive damages are employed as a form of punishment, the
narrow historical conception of punitive damages as punishment for private

96.
97.
98.
99.

Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866) (emphasis omitted).
Hauser v. Griffith, 71 N.W. 223, 223 (Iowa 1897).
Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 288 (1878).
See Colby, supra note 9, at 620-27. Benjamin Zipursky argues that my “history is probably
distorted and incomplete” because “punitive damages traditionally served multiple
purposes”—not just as punishment for private wrongs. Zipursky, supra note 7, at 143; see
also Sebok, supra note 78, at 1004 (“I have detailed elsewhere at least six different functions
that courts attributed to punitive damages in the period examined by Colby . . . .”). It is
certainly true that punitive damages historically served a variety of purposes, as Sebok has
masterfully demonstrated. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why
Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163
(2003). That is a point that I at least partially acknowledged in my prior article, see Colby,
supra note 9, at 622-29, and Sebok’s work makes it even more clear that one cannot distill a
single unifying purpose and theory behind the disjointed and often contradictory pastiche of
early punitive damages decisions. It was therefore unwise and probably misleading for me
to refer on occasion in my prior article to punishment for private wrongs as “the historical
conception” of punitive damages. E.g., Colby, supra note 9, at 652 (emphasis added). But
the key point for my argument was and is that the courts settled on an understanding of
punitive damages as punishment for individual, private wrongs when they confronted the
fundamental constitutional questions that surrounded (and still surround) punitive
damages—in particular the question of why double jeopardy principles are not violated
when a victim is allowed to receive punitive damages for conduct that has already been
criminally punished by the state. The courts relied on the notion of punitive damages as
punishment for private wrongs as the justification for resolving those questions in favor of
the constitutionality of punitive damages. See id. at 620-28. As such, I believe that this
notion is the particular historical understanding of punitive damages that matters most in
ascertaining their constitutionality—and the constitutional constraints upon them—today.
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wrongs is constitutionally mandated; to employ punitive damages as
punishment for public wrongs without affording all of the procedural
safeguards that the Constitution would mandate if the same penalty were
being sought as a criminal fine violates procedural due process.100 That, I
submit, is the true reason why imposing punitive damages as punishment for
harm to third parties violates procedural due process. And thus, that is the best
justification for the result in Williams.
The argument begins by observing that, even in the nineteenth century, the
constitutionality of punitive damages was highly dubious. Critics questioned
how the Constitution could fairly be interpreted to permit a form of judicially
imposed punishment without affording the defendant the benefits of the
criminal procedural safeguards mandated by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments (and their state law equivalents).101 The best
known and most bilious of those many critics, Justice Foster of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, queried,
Why longer tolerate a false doctrine, which, in its practical
exemplification, deprives a defendant of his constitutional right of
indictment or complaint on oath before being called into court?
deprives him of the right of meeting the witnesses against him face to
face? deprives him of the right of not being compelled to testify
against himself? deprives him of the right of being acquitted, unless
the proof of his offence is established beyond all reasonable doubt?
deprives him of the right of not being punished twice for the same
offence?

100.

101.
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When I previously took a very cursory (and unsatisfactory) stab at that task, see Colby, supra
note 9, at 643-50, my effort was easily mistaken for an essentially originalist argument that
“history carries dispositive weight in defining constitutional rights.” Zipursky, supra note 7,
at 142-43; see also Sebok, supra note 78, at 1005 n.213 (“It is an understatement to say that
Colby’s argument relies on a controversial originalist interpretation of the Constitution.”).
As this Part seeks to explain, my argument is not, in fact, originalist. Rather, it is grounded
in part in a necessary limitation on the originalist argument that the courts—especially the
Supreme Court—have employed in upholding the constitutionality of punitive damages.
That is to say, it is the courts that have chosen to defend the constitutionality of punitive
damages on purely originalist grounds; the argument here is that, even if one accepts the
propriety of an originalist defense, that defense demonstrably does not establish the
constitutionality of total harm punitive damages.
See, e.g., Lewis Lawrence Smith, Punitive Damages, 41 AM. L. REG. & REV. 517, 518 (1893)
(“[T]he unfortunate defendant is not only not permitted to ask to have this anomalous
crime, for such it amounts to, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is denied many other
rights accorded to the lowest criminal.”).
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Punitive damages destroy every constitutional safeguard within
their reach.102
When courts confronted these arguments, they rejected them on the lone
ground that punitive damages were well established in the law, and a “rule so
long and so generally established is a sin against sound judicial principle, not
against the constitution.”103 Even the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the history
to deflect these objections. As early as 1851, the Court wrote, “We are aware
that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if
repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best
exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument.”104
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court based its
assertion that “[t]he imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in [civil]
cases cannot be opposed as in conflict with the prohibition against the
deprivation of property without due process of law,” and “cannot therefore be
justly assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States,” on the sole ground that the “propriety and
legality [of punitive damages] have been recognized . . . by repeated judicial
decisions for more than a century.”105
A century later, the constitutional attack on punitive damages resumed.
Commentators again charged that punitive damages are unconstitutional
because they impose punishment without affording criminal procedural
protections.106 In 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip107 to consider, among other questions, whether
punitive damages “although nominally civil, must be considered sufficiently
criminal in nature . . . to entitle [the defendant] to certain protections under

102.
103.
104.

105.
106.

107.

Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1873).
Brown, 44 Wis. at 282, 288; see also, e.g., Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539, 543 (1861); Duckett v.
Pool, 13 S.E. 542, 547 (S.C. 1891).
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); see also Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.
v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492-93 (1875) (“[A]lthough some text-writers and courts have
questioned its soundness, it has been accepted as the general rule in England and in most of
the States of this country.”).
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889).
See, e.g., Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 241 (1985); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”108
As it had done a hundred years before, the Court rejected that argument on the
sole ground that “the common-law method for assessing punitive damages was
well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted” and
“[n]othing in that Amendment’s text or history indicates an intention on the
part of its drafters to overturn the prevailing method.”109 It was only because of
“this consistent history”—because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has not
displaced the procedure of the ages”—that the Court found no procedural due
process violation: “If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it.”110 As Justice Kennedy emphasized in his concurrence, “[T]he
judgment of history should govern the outcome in the case before us.”111
Whether or not this historically grounded, originalist defense of the
constitutionality of punitive damages is a good one, it remains the only defense
that the courts have ever offered to the charge that punitive damages are
unconstitutional for failing to provide criminal procedural safeguards.112 And,

108.

109.
110.

111.

112.
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Brief of Petitioner at i, Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (No. 89-1279). Citing Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,
397 (1873), quoted above, the Court explained that it granted certiorari “to review the
punitive damages procedures and award in the light of the long-enduring debate about their
propriety.” Haslip, 499 U.S. at 8.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17-18.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court went on to note that it would be “inappropriate to say
that, because punitive damages have been recognized for so long, their imposition is never
unconstitutional.” Id. at 18. It thus proceeded to consider the fairness of the actual punitive
damages award in the case before it. See id. at 18-24. But its basic holding that punitive
damages are not categorically unconstitutional despite their failure to provide criminal
procedural protections was based solely on their historical pedigree. In Zipursky’s words,
“the majority opinion comfortably gave presumptive weight to history in its due process
analysis.” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 114.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, the Court’s holding in
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), that the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages was largely
grounded in the originalist argument that “the Framers of the Eighth Amendment did not
expressly intend it to apply to damages awards made by civil juries.” Id. at 273. The Court
recognized, in nonoriginalist fashion, that there are some occasions in which the Eighth
Amendment should be expanded to cover new punishments not envisioned by the Framers.
But this was not one of them: “This aspect of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence might
have some force here were punitive damages a strictly modern creation, without solid
grounding in pre-Revolutionary days. But . . . [the punitive damages] doctrine was
expressly recognized in cases as early as 1763.” Id. at 273-74.
In fact, courts have long suggested that, were it not for history, they would find punitive
damages to be unconstitutional. See Colby, supra note 9, at 645-46 (collecting cases). In
1884, the Colorado Supreme Court actually found punitive damages unconstitutional
precisely because they punish the defendant without affording the procedural protections of
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for two reasons, it is necessarily dependent on an understanding of punitive
damages as punishment for private wrongs.
First, as a matter of both sound logic and sound constitutional reasoning,
even if we accept the propriety of originalism, the constitutionality of a current
practice can be grounded in its long historical pedigree only if the practice that
is being defended today is essentially the same practice that enjoys the long
historical pedigree. The Court has, for instance, upheld the constitutionality of
obscenity laws in large part on the basis of their long tradition of historical
acceptance.113 But of course a state could not pass a law redefining “obscenity”
to include any speech critical of the Governor and then rely on the cases
upholding obscenity bans on historical grounds as an absolute justification for
the new law. Even if we accept the basic claim that history justifies exempting
obscenity from the rules that would otherwise govern the regulation of speech
under the First Amendment, an “obscenity” ban that goes well beyond what
was historically encompassed by that term—to an entirely different kind of
speech—would have no claim to a valid defense grounded in history simply
because it co-opts an old historical label.
The same is true of punitive damages. As I have previously written, the
fact that the historical institution of punitive damages has been around
for centuries . . . does not . . . mean that any remedy that a modern
court chooses to call ‘punitive damages’ is automatically
constitutional. If the courts completely change the fundamental nature
of the institution of punitive damages, slapping the old label on them
will not avoid all questions of constitutional infirmity.114

113.
114.

a criminal trial. See Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 120-21 (Colo. 1884). Colorado was a rare
state in which the question was still an open one in the late nineteenth century, allowing the
court to decide it as a matter of first impression, unencumbered by dubious historical
precedents. The court surmised that “[w]ere this subject now presented to the various
[other] courts of the country for the first time, we have little doubt as to what the verdict
would be.” Id. at 120; see also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74
(Wash. 1891) (addressing the issue anew, “untrammeled by former decisions,” and
concluding that, because “many of the time-honored rules governing the trial of criminal
actions, and of the rights that have been secured to defendants in criminal actions from the
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, are absolutely ignored,”
punitive damages are “repugnant to every sense of justice” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
Colby, supra note 9, at 647.
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When the Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, upheld punitive damages
based on their historical pedigree, it understood them to punish “the wrong
done to the plaintiff”115—that is, to be imposed “for the redress of private
wrongs.”116 If the courts change the very nature of punitive damages from
punishment for private wrongs to individuals to punishment for public wrongs
to society, then they can no longer rely on history as an absolute constitutional
shield—even if they choose to be originalists.
There is a second, related reason why the historical pedigree defense of the
constitutionality of punitive damages is dependent upon the conception of
punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs. Why did nineteenthcentury courts declare that punitive damages are punishment for private
wrongs? That conception was well grounded in the emerging understanding of
the unique nature and role of punitive damages,117 but the courts did not
coalesce around it or articulate it clearly until they were forced to do so to
deflect constitutional attacks—in particular, to deflect the argument that, to
avoid unconstitutional double jeopardy, punitive damages should not be
allowed where the defendant’s conduct was also punished as a crime. The
rejoinder to that argument that prevailed in the courts was that there was no
double jeopardy violation because the defendant was not being punished twice
for the same offense. Each punishment was for a distinct legal wrong—the
criminal punishment for the public wrong to society, and the civil punishment
for the private wrong to the plaintiff.118 “In this view,” explained one court,
“the awarding of punitive damages can in no just sense be said to be in conflict
with the constitutional or common law inhibition against inflicting two
punishments for the same offense.”119 If punitive damages had been
understood at the time as punishment for public wrongs, the courts would
have struck them down.120
In other words, it was only because punitive damages punished a private
wrong legally distinct from the public wrong that is punished by the criminal

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
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Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 521 (1885).
See infra Part IV.
See Colby, supra note 9, at 621-22.
Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379, 391 (1866); see also, e.g., Zick v. Smith, 112 A. 846,
846 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1921) (arguing that the double jeopardy argument “is illogical” because
the “criminal action is a punishment for the wrong done to the public” whereas the
“punitive damages [award] is a punishment for the wrong done to the individual”), aff’d,
116 A. 927 (N.J. 1922).
Indeed, a few courts did just that before the notion of punishment for private wrongs
triumphed in punitive damages law. See Colby, supra note 9, at 620 & n.130.
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law—and because they had been around for a long time in that limited form—
that the courts historically upheld their constitutionality. History, therefore,
provides no basis for upholding the constitutionality of punitive damages
conceived, as by the Williams dissent (and perhaps the Williams majority as
well), as punishment for public wrongs. And yet history is the only defense
that the Supreme Court has ever offered in response to these fundamental
constitutional objections.

iv. present: procedural due process and punishment for
private wrongs
Of course, it is possible that total harm punitive damages as punishment
for public wrongs can continue to stand on firm constitutional footing even
after the mistaken crutch of history is pulled out from under them.121 But this
Part aims to establish that they cannot. And beyond that, it seeks to provide a
theoretical justification for the entire notion of punitive damages as
punishment for private wrongs—a justification that critics of my prior work
have suggested is lacking.122 Indeed, some critics have gone so far as to opine
that “the concept of a distinct category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’
wrongs is, at its foundation, incoherent.”123 This Part seeks to establish that the
notion of punishment for private wrongs is not simply a nonsensical and
archaic relic of nineteenth-century thinking that we are left to accept, warts and
all, if we want to continue to rely on history as a constitutional defense of
punitive damages. Rather, it is to this day a sensible and theoretically
defensible notion, and it makes sense both conceptually and doctrinally (rather
than just historically) to say that punishment for private wrongs—unlike
punishment for public wrongs—does not necessitate the provision of criminal
procedural safeguards. Cass Sunstein and others have lamented that our “legal
culture lacks a full normative account of the relationship between retributive
goals and punitive damages.”124 This Part seeks to provide that account.125

121.

122.
123.
124.

See Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
408, 409 (1967) (arguing that the lack of criminal procedural protections can be justified by
more than simply “the law’s tendency to ‘domesticate’ its inconsistencies—to accept
contradictions simply because it has lived with them for so long”).
See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 78, at 1002-04; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 143.
Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53
EMORY L.J. 1, 19 n.90 (2004).
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2085 (1998).
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The argument in this Part builds upon the important work of Anthony Sebok and Benjamin
Zipursky. Sebok and Zipursky have each taken great pains to distinguish their recently
promulgated theories of punitive damages from my own (and each other’s). See Sebok,
supra note 78, at 1002-06 (seeking to distinguish his theory of punitive damages as private
revenge from my theory of punitive damages as private punishment); id. at 1025-29 (seeking
to distinguish his theory from Zipursky’s theory of punitive damages as, in part, vindicating
a plaintiff’s right to be punitive); Zipursky, supra note 7, at 141-44, 157-58 (seeking to
distinguish his theory from mine); id. at 147 (seeking to distinguish his theory from
Sebok’s). But in fact, our theories share a great deal in common. When I say that punitive
damages are punishment for private wrongs, I mean precisely that punitive damages are a
form of legally sanctioned private revenge, designed to vindicate a plaintiff’s legal right to be
punitive in a court of law.
Still, while I am deeply indebted to Sebok and Zipursky for adding normative flesh to
my bare-bones historical argument, I ultimately agree that, although we arrive at nearly the
same place, and although we share many of the same reasons for preferring that place to the
alternatives, we take very different routes to get there—and our approaches have very
different implications for the future of extracompensatory damages. Sebok and Zipursky fit
their accounts into the “civil recourse” theory of tort law. See Sebok, supra note 78, at 102329; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 151-61. So too does John Goldberg, who also defends a vision
of punitive damages largely in accordance with the one presented here. See John C.P.
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 3, 7 (2004) (arguing that “[w]hat is at stake in [punitive damages] is not [the
state’s] interest[] in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens or in deterring sharp
business practices, but the [plaintiffs’] interest in vindicating their rights not to be
mistreated in the way that they were,” which includes “providing them with satisfaction—a
remedy adequate to acknowledge and avenge [the defendant’s] predatory conduct towards
them”); see also id. at 4 n.2 (citing my work, and particularly Sebok’s and Zipursky’s, as
having “heavily influenced” his “thinking on the subject of punitive damages”). The civil
recourse school is premised on the principle that “the animating idea behind our system of
tort law” is “that an individual who has been wronged is entitled to an avenue of recourse
against the wrongdoer.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great
Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (2005). Thus, Goldberg’s and Sebok’s arguments that
“tort law is not defensible as public regulatory law” are more theoretical than constitutional
and are sweeping in their normative scope. Goldberg, supra, at 4. Zipursky’s equally
sweeping argument includes what may be a constitutional bent, but one that is ultimately
unsatisfying. See infra Section IV.C.
My conception of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs—as legalized
revenge—is more in harmony with some normative theories of tort law, such as civil
recourse, than others. Indeed, with its emphasis on vindicating the private rights of the
plaintiff, it fits comfortably within most corrective justice theories. See, e.g., Richard W.
Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159, 175
(David G. Owen ed., 1997) (arguing that the notion of punitive damages as retribution “for
the discrete wrong done to a particular individual” accords with corrective justice); see also
Mark Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 275-84
(2008) (noting that this conception of punitive damages accords with a compensatory
theory of tort law). The notion of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs is
seemingly less compatible with utility maximization theories that view tort law primarily in
regulatory terms—as serving a collective public interest, rather than the individual private
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A. Punishing Private Wrongs: Private Revenge
The idea of punitive damages as punishment only for private wrongs might
seem at first blush to be counterintuitive and hypertechnical. Most people
probably share the instinct of the plaintiff’s counsel in Williams, who insisted
at oral argument that it makes no sense to suggest that it was inappropriate to
punish Philip Morris for the harm done to nonparties because “[p]unitive
damages do not punish for harm, they punish misconduct.”126 That is to say,
the law punishes a wrongdoer for engaging in wrongful behavior, not for
causing harm. Either we punish wrongful behavior, or we do not. The
assertion that punitive damages can punish only the private wrong that arises
from a wrongful act (the harm to the individual victim), but not the public
wrong that arises from that same act (the harm to society), has the ring of
proverbial angels dancing on the head of pin. At first, it seems nonsensical, or
at least implausibly legalistic, to suggest that tort law can somehow punish
only the private aspect of the wrongful act, but not the public aspect. How can
the law isolate only one consequence of wrongful conduct for punishment?
And in any event, what exactly is the public harm to society other than the
harm done to the particular victim—an individual in the public community?
Overcoming these objections requires a deeper exploration of both the
nature of private wrongs and the nature of punishment itself.

126.

interest of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra, at 99, 100-11.
But cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 948 (1998) (taking into account in economic analysis “the pleasure or
satisfaction people obtain from seeing blameworthy parties punished”). Insofar as I see
normative value in using punitive damages to punish private wrongs, see infra Section IV.B,
I am sympathetic to corrective justice theories in general and to civil recourse in particular.
But I am also open to the proposition that tort law can sometimes be employed to serve
solely public, regulatory aims; I do not mean to endorse or rely here upon any particular tort
theory. My primary argument is that if punitive damages are used as punishment, they must
serve as punishment for private wrongs, not public ones. That is fundamentally a
constitutional claim, not a theoretical one. As I make clear in Part V, nothing in Williams, or
in my own argument, would preclude the use of extracompensatory damages to serve
nonpunitive public ends of the type sought by those whose tort theories focus on utility
maximization rather than corrective justice. Thus, the argument in this Article is perfectly
consonant with a pluralist vision of tort law as serving many different ends. See, e.g.,
Calabresi, supra note 23; Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Toward a
Reasonable Accommodation, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276 (Gerald J. Postema
ed., 2001); Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in
Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra, at 183.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007)
(No. 05-1256).
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1. The Nature of Private Wrongs
As Judge Richard Posner has explained, “Crimes and torts frequently
overlap. In particular, most crimes that cause definite losses to ascertainable
victims are also torts: the crime of theft is the tort of conversion; the crime of
assault is the tort of battery—and the crime of fraud is the tort of fraud.”127 Yet
this overlap does not create redundancy. The tort and the crime arise from the
same wrongful act, but they are distinct legal wrongs, invading the rights of
separate victims.128 The tort is a private wrong to the individual victim; the
crime is a public wrong to society. In William Blackstone’s classic formulation,
private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringement . . . of the civil
rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals;
public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community,
considered as a community, in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity.129
If I assault someone, I simultaneously commit a private wrong against
him—I cause him pain and humiliation and fear—and a public wrong against
society—I disturb the peace and violate the social order. Each of those distinct
legal wrongs is redressible in its own way, by its own victim. The wrong to
society—the crime—can only be redressed by society’s legal representative, the
prosecutor, in a criminal prosecution. The wrong to my individual victim—the
tort—can only be redressed by the individual victim himself in a civil lawsuit.130
Thus, Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews miss the mark when they
assert that the distinction between punishment for public wrongs and
punishment for private wrongs is “incoherent” because “[w]hen the state seeks
to punish for public wrongs, it is usually doing so to punish and deter harms to
private individuals.”131 It is, of course, true that public wrongs usually (though
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United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Merchs.’ & Mechs.’ Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. 42, 45 (1861) (“The
private wrong was not merged in the public one, nor is the public prosecution intended to
supersede the private action. Their purposes are entirely different.”).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 4 (2000) (noting that the “purpose of
criminal punishment is primarily to vindicate the state’s interests” whereas the “purpose of
tort liability” is “primarily to vindicate the individual victim and the victim’s rights”).
Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 19 n.90.
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not always) stem from acts that also harm private individuals. But our law
insists that the criminal punishment—the punishment for the public wrong
arising out of the act, as distinct from the private wrong—is punishment for
the harm done to society, not for the harm done to the individual victim. 132
Blackstone explained that “the king, in whom centers the majesty of the whole
community, is supposed by the law to be the person injured by every infraction
of the public rights belonging to that community.”133 In America, the state has
replaced the King; a crime—a public wrong—is a wrong against the state alone,
as the representative of the community.134 Courts have insisted that “[w]e must
remember that a criminal offense is an offense against the sovereign state, and
not against an individual.”135
Of course, in our common parlance, we speak of the individual as the
“victim” of the crime, and in our casual thought we tend to think of the
criminal law as punishing the defendant for what he did to the individual
victim. But that impulse is misleading. In fact, the criminal law punishes the
defendant for the harm to society that resulted from his decision to engage in
the conduct that hurt the individual victim.
In this regard, my theory has been criticized on the ground that “it is hard
to accept that the criminal punishment meted out is only for the public wrong,
not the private wrong.”136 Yet that is the law. The notion that a crime is a
wrong to society, not to an individual, and the related notion that the criminal
law punishes the defendant only for the wrong to society, not for the wrong

132.

133.
134.

135.

136.

See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1806 (1992) (“Within the criminal paradigm, wrongful acts are
sanctioned because they are public wrongs, violating a collective rather than an individual
interest.”).
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at *2.
See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 418 (2008) (“[A] crime is by definition a public
wrong, and one against all the people of the state . . . .”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (8th
ed. 2004) (defining “criminal law” as “[t]he body of law defining offenses against the
community at large”).
Ex parte Galbreath, 139 N.W. 1050, 1051 (N.D. 1913). This notion traces back to Cesare
Beccaria, who insisted that “the true measure of crimes is . . . harm to society.” CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 24 (Richard Bellamy ed.,
Richard Davies & Virginia Cox trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1766); see also William
F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim,
13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 655 (1976) (“Beccaria took issue with the proposition that the
primary purpose of the criminal justice system was to serve as an aid to private action in
obtaining redress from the criminal. Since the system arose from a social contract, it should
serve the interests of society, not the individual victim.” (footnote omitted)). The emergence
of this conception of the criminal law is discussed further in Subsection IV.A.3.
Zipursky, supra note 7, at 144.
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done to the individual, is not simply a meaningless legal fiction. It is
profoundly important at both the theoretical and practical levels.
When one person assaults or kills or rapes another, that act not only causes
tremendous pain to the individual victim, it also makes us all feel less secure. It
makes us afraid for our own safety. It harms the unity and the security of the
community that we share. That is the public wrong—the wrong that is the
business of the criminal law.137 “That additional fear confers upon crime its
public nature and, arguably, justifies the punitive intervention of the state.”138
The criminal law is not concerned with the private wrong to the individual
victim.139
To illustrate this point, consider a case like Eacret v. Holmes,140 in which the
court denied standing to the parents of a murder victim who sought to
preclude a governor who was morally opposed to the death penalty from
commuting the sentence of their son’s killer. The court explained that, even
though the parents naturally “should feel more deeply upon the subject than
other members of the general public,” the criminal punishment was not being
imposed for their (or their son’s) benefit any more than for the benefit of
anyone else:
Punishment for crime is not a matter of private vengeance, but of
public policy. Any violation of constitutional rights which might be
supposed to flow from what is asserted to be an ‘unconstitutional’
exercise by the executive of the pardoning power would affect equally
all the people of the state, rather than the plaintiffs in a different and
special way.141
Another illustration of this point can be found in the black-letter rule that,
because the crime consists of the public wrong to society, not the private wrong

137.
138.
139.

140.
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See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 67 (1974) (distinguishing crime
from tort on the ground that the former induces fear in the general public).
George P. Fletcher, A Transaction Theory of Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 921, 925 (1985).
See id. (rejecting a theory of crime that “treats the criminal harm as the violation of a single
person’s interest in not suffering the involuntary loss of his entitlements,” because that
theory fails to recognize that “criminal harms are not merely private and thus limited to the
victim, but public in their impact”); McDonald, supra note 135, at 650 (“Crime is now
conceived of entirely in terms of an offense against society. The damage to the individual
victim is incidental and its redress is [not] regarded as a function of the criminal justice
process.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.
333 P.2d 741 (Or. 1958).
Id. at 743.
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to the victim, it is not up the individual victim to determine whether to pursue
(or abandon) a criminal prosecution.
Because a crime is by definition a public wrong against the State, it is
not usually an acceptable defense that the person wronged by a
criminal has condoned the offense. Neither repayment of the victim
nor settlement between the defendant and victim will constitute a bar
to conviction of the offender.142
This notion goes back at least as far as Cesare Beccaria, who explained that the
“right to have someone punished does not belong to any individual; it is the
right of all the citizens and of the sovereign. The individual can give up his part
of this right, but he cannot cancel that of others.”143
Indeed, a public wrong can occur even in the absence of an individual
victim. If a person drives drunk and is fortunate enough not to cause an
accident, she does not commit a tort; there was no individual victim of her
dangerous conduct, and thus no private wrong. But she still commits a crime;
her conduct has violated the social contract, made us all less secure, and
threatened harm to society.144
In sum, a private wrong is a tort. It is legally distinct from a public wrong—
a crime—even when both wrongs arise out of the very same act, and even when
an individual injury stands at the heart of the crime. And when the criminal
law punishes the public wrong (the crime), it does not punish the defendant
for having committed the private wrong (the tort), and it does not vindicate
any personalized interest that the individual victim might have in punishing
the defendant that is distinct from the interest that all of society has in seeing
the defendant punished.145

142.
143.
144.

145.

Pratt v. State, 307 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
BECCARIA, supra note 135, at 75.
See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 130, § 2, at 5 (“Criminal law redresses the state’s interests in the
security of society. It may punish conduct that threatens those interests even when no harm
has been done. Speeding increases risks to others and so may be punished criminally. Tort
law, aimed at protection of individuals, would never impose liability for speeding alone; tort
law would impose liability only if harm results.”).
The traditional absence of the individual victim’s interest from the criminal law may be
slowly eroding. The recent move toward including restitution as part of the criminal
sentence is obviously concerned with the victim’s interests. See, e.g., United States v.
Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the emergence of restitution in
American criminal law has challenged the traditional view that criminal “[o]ffenses were
thought of as crimes against society, rather than against the individual”). But restitution is
about compensation, not punishment. As Judge Posner has explained, including restitution
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2. Punishment and Compensation in Criminal and Civil Law
Our legal system draws a fundamental distinction between punishment
and compensation. Compensation is concerned with making the victim whole,
whereas punishment is concerned with making the perpetrator suffer.146 And
our legal system generally proceeds from the assumption that punishment is
the proper remedy for a public wrong, whereas compensation is the proper
remedy for a private wrong. Prosser and Keeton give the hornbook rule: “The
purpose of [a criminal] proceeding is to protect and vindicate the interests of
the public as a whole, by punishing . . . . The civil action for a tort, on the other

146.
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in the criminal case essentially tacks on a private tort suit to a criminal proceeding in the
interest of judicial economy. See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999). It
does not necessarily reconceptualize the criminal offense as one against the individual
victim. The broader victims’ rights movement, by contrast, does indeed represent an effort
to reconceptualize the criminal law as engaged (at least in part) in the business of private
vengeance—punishing the private wrong. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the CriminalCivil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 689 (1999) (arguing that the victims’ rights
movement seeks “to transform a proceeding that is supposed to be about a wrong to society
into a proceeding about the harm to . . . individual private victims”); Doug Janicik, Note,
Allowing Victims’ Families To View Executions: The Eighth Amendment and Society’s
Justifications for Punishment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 935, 973 (2000) (“[S]tate legislatures, under
the disguise of the victims’ rights movement, have endorsed a private form of
vengeance . . . .”); id. (“While the penal system wants to ensure the criminal gets his ‘just
deserts’ for violating the law and moral standards that define our community, the victim’s
family wants revenge only for its injury.”). This movement has found some success in
reforming the criminal law. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation To Resolve
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1248-49 (1994) (discussing the
growth in victim-offender mediation programs); Robert C. Davis, Barbara Smith & Susan
Hillenbrand, Restitution: The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 746, 748-50 (1992)
(discussing the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act and the use of restitution in state
courts); Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 241
(2005) (discussing state victims’ rights amendments and statutes). But it certainly has not
yet succeeded in changing the very nature of criminal sanctions. See Mark S. Umbreit et al.,
Restorative Justice: An Empirically Grounded Movement Facing Many Opportunities and Pitfalls,
8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 514 (2007) (noting that in our legal system, crime is still
“viewed as having been committed against the state,” but offering restorative justice (the
notion upon which the victims’ rights movement is based) as a “very different way of
understanding and responding to crime” that “recognizes crime as being directed against
individual people” rather than “viewing the state as the primary victim in criminal acts”); see
also Jordan J. Ballor, To Reform or To Abolish? Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison,
and Restorative Justice, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 481, 511 (2008) (“[A]dvocates of restorative
justice agree that the status quo of criminal justice needs to be altered.”).
See Gail Heriot, An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive
Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 43, 47-48 (1996).
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hand, is commenced and maintained by the injured person, and its primary
purpose is to compensate for the damage suffered.”147
Against this background, it may seem odd to suggest that punitive damages
punish private wrongs. If private wrongs are, by definition, wrongs that call for
compensation, not punishment, and if civil suits are, by definition, suits that
seek compensation, not punishment, then punishment for private wrongs in a
civil lawsuit appears to be nonsensical.
That is, indeed, exactly what nineteenth-century critics argued. In the
colorful words of the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
How could the idea of punishment be deliberately and designedly
installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is not punishment out of
place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to
say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies? What
kind of a civil remedy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the
defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an
unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law.148
Modern critics have continued to sound this theme that “[p]unitive damage
awards corrupt the distinction between the civil and criminal law.”149 As
Prosser and Keeton wrote, punitive damages appear “anomalous” insofar as
“the ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts.”150
The problem here is more than just one of asymmetry and anomaly. It is
one of constitutionality and procedural fairness. When the criminal courts
punish, they do so only after providing the procedural protections of the
criminal law. The Constitution tolerates nothing less. But when civil courts
punish, they do so without affording any of those safeguards. Thus, the most
fundamental of all questions surrounding punitive damages is how it can be
constitutional for courts to administer them as punishment without criminal
procedural safeguards. As noted above, that concern has long formed the heart

147.
148.
149.
150.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
L.S. (Bob) Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline,
11 FORUM 57, 58 (1975).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 147, § 2, at 9. For a sophisticated argument that this invasion
is theoretically unjustifiable, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 86-93 (2003).
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of the argument that punitive damages are unconstitutional.151 In David
Owen’s words, the lack of criminal procedural safeguards in the assessment of
punitive damages “assures that controversy and debate follow such
assessments wherever they may roam, as surely as summer follows spring.”152
This Article suggests a resolution to the controversy—one that stems from
the distinction between punishing public and private wrongs. As a matter of
both theory and law, there is a profound difference between the two, and that
difference explains why criminal procedural safeguards are not necessary for
punitive damages that punish the defendant only for the harm caused to the
plaintiff.
3. Public Retribution and Private Revenge
To explain the theoretical difference between punishment for public
wrongs and punishment for private wrongs, it is helpful to step back into the
past, when there was no difference between the two. In Anglo-Saxon times,
legal proceedings to redress wrongs were initiated by individuals, not the
state.153 The remedies that were recoverable in those proceedings were intended
both to punish the wrongdoer and to compensate the victim.154 They were
revenge and compensation rolled into one.155
The common law, however, quickly developed a sharp distinction between
punishment and compensation. The writ of trespass (a precursor to the
modern civil tort action) was the vehicle by which a victim could seek
compensation. Punishment, by contrast, was achieved through the appeal of
felony, a legal action privately initiated by the victim that was essentially
criminal in nature.156 Through the mechanism of the latter action, the legal
system relied primarily on the individual victim to impose punishment on the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.
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See supra Part III.
David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 363, 366 (1994).
See Anthony J. Sebok, Introduction: What Does It Mean To Say that a Remedy Punishes?, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3-4 (2003).
See id.; Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1397-1400
(2003).
See Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1399 (noting that, in addition to being compensatory, the
Anglo-Saxon wergeld system “served, at least in part, as a civilized substitute for violent
revenge” and “can be viewed as entailing revenge in a more civilized form”).
See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 59, 83-86 (1996).
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wrongdoer.157 As Lawrence Friedman explains, in England, “there was no such
thing as a ‘district attorney,’ that is, a paid official whose job was to prosecute
crime on behalf of the state.”158 Rather, individual victims “were supposed to
prosecute on their own—and at their own expense.”159 For centuries in
England, the responsibility for criminal prosecution was placed upon the
victim, rather than the state.160
These private criminal actions were motivated by a desire for revenge,
rather than a desire for compensation.161 Legal historian David Seipp explains
that medieval “[l]awyers named vengeance as the motive for bringing appeals
of felony.”162 These actions were “instruments of vengeance.”163 Seipp notes
that the historical sources “attest to powerful feelings of vengeance on the part
of . . . victims,” and explains that the “motive of vengeance was more readily
understood and accepted in the Middle Ages than it is now. The church taught
that vengeance was a virtue and sometimes a duty.”164 Indeed, explains Seipp,
“[i]f courts of law had not provided a means of seeking vengeance, victims
would more readily have resorted to bloodfeuds, cycles of retaliation that
would escalate and last for generations.”165 As the English historian J.F.
Stephen famously declared, “The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge
in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”166
Accordingly, as crime and tort emerged as distinct branches of the common
law, the distinction between the two initially did not turn on the identity of the
prosecutor; both actions were privately prosecuted by the individual victim.
Nor did it turn on whose interests were being served; both actions satisfied the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47
ARK. L. REV. 511, 515 (1994); Seipp, supra note 156, at 61-72.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1993).
Id. at 29.
See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
357, 359-66 (1986).
See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245 (photo.
reprint 1996) (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) (“[T]he private vengeance of the person
wronged by a crime was the principal source to which men trusted for the administration of
justice in early times.”); Bessler, supra note 157, at 515 (“According to . . . historians, private
prosecutions developed in England as a means of facilitating private vengeance.”).
Seipp, supra note 156, at 63.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63-64
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (photo.
reprint 2005) (London, Macmillan 1863).
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private interests of the victim. Rather, the distinction lay in the victim’s motive
for bringing the lawsuit and the remedy sought: “The crux of the distinction
between crime and tort in the early common law was the choice of vengeance
or compensation.”167 Victims who preferred compensation could bring an
action for a writ of trespass; victims who preferred vengeance could bring an
appeal of felony. “They could either put their wrongdoers to death and collect
nothing [through an appeal of felony], or collect money for themselves and
leave their wrongdoers alive with the rest of their wealth intact [through a writ
of trespass].”168
Gradually, over the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, the
primary method of prosecuting crimes shifted from criminal actions brought
by the victims to criminal actions brought by the Crown—that is, indictments
of felony.169 These publicly prosecuted criminal actions, unlike their privately
prosecuted predecessors, were not designed or understood to serve the goal of
vengeance.170 Rather, they were brought to vindicate the peace of the
community. Seipp explains that “the king punished felons because every
subject wanted or should want them punished. The king’s peace was their
peace. A felon to the king was a felon to the whole kingdom. Robbery and
fighting offended the whole community, not just the individual victim.”171 This
was the emergence of the distinction between punishing public wrongs and
punishing private wrongs. As the identity of the prosecutor changed, the goal
of the criminal law changed along with it—from securing individual revenge to
vindicating and protecting the public peace.172 Thus emerged the modern rule

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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Seipp, supra note 156, at 84.
Id.
See id. at 72-73.
See id. at 73 (“Lawyers did not describe the king’s motive for prosecuting felons as a desire
for vengeance.”).
Id. at 74.
See also, e.g., Brown, supra note 145, at 1254-55; Davis et al., supra note 145, at 746 (“As time
passed, a distinction was gradually drawn between offenses against the social order (crimes)
and offenses between individuals (civil wrongs). In the former cases, the state replaced
victims as the wronged party in criminal proceedings.”). Here in America, privately initiated
criminal prosecutions lingered longer. See Brown, supra note 145, at 1255; William F.
McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION,
RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977)
(noting that many criminal prosecutions in colonial America were perceived as redressing an
individual injury and were privately prosecuted). Thus, during the colonial era, “criminal
law was a combination of both public and private prosecution.” Rachel King, Why a Victims’
Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 357, 367 (2000). And some of those privately prosecuted actions may have
afforded the possibility of simultaneously attaining both revenge and compensation. See
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that the victim, even if he chooses to forgive the wrongdoer, does not have the
authority to end a criminal prosecution.173 That was the opposite of the rule
that had governed privately initiated criminal prosecutions by appeal of felony:
because those actions were designed to vindicate the victim’s desire for
revenge, not the king’s peace, wrongdoers who obtained royal pardons “could
not use them to avoid sentences of death on appeals brought by victims.”174
Thus, by the dawn of the modern era, private vengeance had fallen out of both
the civil law, which had by this time long been concerned with compensation
alone,175 and the criminal law, which was now concerned with the peace of the
public community.176
Yet the desire for revenge burns bright in the human heart—too bright for
the law to ignore.177 The common law thus found a new outlet for revenge:

173.
174.
175.

176.

177.

McDonald, supra note 135, at 652-53. By the early nineteenth century, however, the English
notion that crimes are public wrongs to society, rather than private wrongs to individuals,
had taken root in America as well, and privately initiated prosecutions fell into disuse. See
Brown, supra note 145, at 1255.
See Seipp, supra note 156, at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
See Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1400 (“[P]rivate remedies became a vehicle for redressing
losses . . . .”). Emily Sherwin argues that the Anglo-Saxon roots of compensatory damages
as a stylized form of revenge are still felt in some aspects of compensatory damages
doctrine—that “some aspects of modern compensatory remedies suggest that the law still
provides an outlet for the impulse toward personal revenge.” Id.; see also Marc Galanter &
David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393,
1406 (1993) (noting that many plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in part “for purposes
of vengeance, retribution, or vindication”). Be that as it may, compensatory damages are
designed and calibrated to compensate, not to facilitate revenge.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained,
In an early day in England private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs which they
suffered. They obtained an indictment from a grand jury, and it became the duty
and the privilege of the person injured to provide a prosecutor at his own expense
to prosecute the indicted person. Our scheme of government has changed all this.
It is now deemed the better public policy to provide for the public prosecution of
public wrongs without any interference on the part of private parties, although
they may have been injured in a private capacity different from the general public
injury that accrues to society when a crime is committed. So under our system we
have private prosecution for private wrongs and public prosecution for public
wrongs.
State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928).
See, e.g., ELLIS COSE, BONE TO PICK 68 (2004) (opining that the “impulse to revenge appears
to be hardwired in humans, a result of our evolutionary development”); Kenworthey Bilz,
The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2007) (citing psychological and
biological studies showing that the urge for revenge is universal, cutting across cultures, and
indeed appears to be present even in nonhuman primates); Richard A. Posner, Retribution
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punitive damages. It is important to note that not all private wrongs—not all
torts—can give rise to punitive damages. Historically, punitive damages were
allowed only for certain kinds of torts: those that violated the dignity of the
victim by insulting or humiliating her.178 Sebok explains that, over time, the
category of private wrongs giving rise to punitive damages expanded, but it has
remained limited to wrongs that “express[] a lack of respect [for] the victims
similar to that expressed by an act of insult or humiliation,” such as fraud, or a
crass corporate decision to place profits over a known risk of harm to
consumers.179 For wrongs such as these—where the defendant has added insult
to injury—compensation is not enough. Victims want revenge.180
That is what punitive damages give them. Punitive damages vindicate the
dignity of an individual victim by allowing her to punish the defendant for
committing a humiliating or insulting tort upon her. When full compensation
is not enough, when the plaintiff also demands to see the defendant suffer for
what he did to her—demands to punish him for what he did to her—she seeks
punitive damages. Punitive damages are legally sanctioned private revenge.181
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179.
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and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 79 (1980) (noting the “vengeful
component in our genetic makeup”).
See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1982); Sebok, supra note 78, at 1007-15. Despite Sebok’s suggestion to the
contrary, see Sebok, supra note 78, at 1006-08, my prior work emphasized both that the
“vindication of the dignity of the victim was the whole point of punitive damages, which, it
will be recalled, were initially imposed only in cases involving insult or affront to the honor
and dignity of the victim,” Colby, supra note 9, at 634-35, and that,
properly understood in reference to their historical roots, these damages are based
in the victim’s right to seek punishment for the private, individualized insult to her
personal honor and dignity. That right—the interest sought to be protected by
punitive damages—is intensely private. It would make no sense to allow a third
party with no relationship to the victim to vindicate it.
Id. at 651 (citations omitted); see also id. at 615, 629-37 (noting that “punitive damages were
initially awarded exclusively in cases that involved an insult to the honor and dignity of the
victim”). Still, Sebok skillfully develops these points well beyond what my prior work had
done.
Sebok, supra note 78, at 1011-15.
“[T]he motivation for revenge is triggered by a transgression of the worth or dignity or
respect of someone.” PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 87 (2001).
On this fundamental point, I am in agreement with Sebok and Zipursky. See Sebok, supra
note 78; Zipursky, supra note 7, at 154 (noting that there is a “quality of vengefulness to
punitive damages”). Other commentators have also made this observation in passing. See,
e.g., Owen, supra note 152, at 375 (referring to punitive damages as a “kind of private
revenge”); Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1402 (suggesting that punitive damages are a form of
“private punishment” that serve the goal of private revenge); Note, Exemplary Damages in
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 521 (1957) (“Many plaintiffs seeking exemplary
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Once we understand that fact, it is worth inquiring whether “punitive”
damages are misnamed. Is the satisfaction of private revenge really a form of
punishment? One could argue that it is not. “Getting even” is, after all, a
metaphor of compensation. Following the reasoning of Jean Hampton, one
could posit that a victim who suffers insult—in Hampton’s terminology “moral
injury”—has been “diminished” by the wrongdoer who fails to recognize and
respect the victim as a person of equal moral worth.182 The victim thus
demands vindication: she wants her moral worth “repaired” by forcing the
defendant to suffer a loss that reequalizes their moral statuses.183 In this
respect, punitive damages ensure that the victim is made whole again not only
financially, medically, and emotionally (which is where compensatory damages
stop), but also morally. The only way to make the victim truly whole is to
allow her to punish the defendant. Only then has her moral status—her
honor—been reestablished. To Hampton, this “is actually a form of
compensation to the victim.”184
Perhaps it is. But even so, it is also punishment.185 If the only way to
achieve full compensation is to allow the plaintiff to impose punishment, then
it is difficult to deny that the additional remedy is punitive, even if it is also in
some nontraditional sense “compensatory.” It is a familiar refrain of punitive
damages law that punitive damages are designed to go further then mere
compensation for insult or humiliation. “Such damages,” say the hornbooks,
“are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for the injuries,

182.
183.
184.
185.

damages are motivated to some extent by a desire to revenge themselves on the
defendant.”).
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659, 1666, 1677 (1992).
Id. at 1686-87. For an excellent discussion of vengeance as a form of equalization of honor in
primitive societies, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006).
Hampton, supra note 182, at 1698; see also Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1432-33;
Owen, supra note 152, at 378; Sebok, supra note 78, at 1019-20.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 189 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(observing that “naked vengeance” is “‘punishment’ in the purest sense”); LEO ZAIBERT,
PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 69-95 (2006) (articulating a detailed philosophical
argument that revenge is a kind of punishment). Of course, one could invest a great deal of
energy wrestling with epistemological questions about the nature of punishment, but I am
inclined to agree with Marc Galanter and David Luban that it suffices for these purposes to
define punishment as simply the “deliberate imposition of a harm, injury, deprivation, or
other bad thing on someone on the ground of the commission of some offense.” Galanter &
Luban, supra note 175, at 1397; cf. H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,
60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 4 (1959) (defining punishment as the imposition by the
legal system of unpleasant consequences upon an offender for an offense against legal rules).
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for the purpose of punishing the defendant.”186 As Arthur Ripstein explains,
“Although the victim suffered an additional dignitary loss, and the punitive
damages serve to address that loss, their purpose is not to compensate for it.
Indeed, their point is precisely that the dignitary loss is not compensable. They
serve instead to vindicate the right.”187
Punitive damages are indeed punishment. But despite the Supreme Court’s
ill-considered dicta to the contrary,188 they are a type of punishment that serves
an entirely different goal from the one served by the criminal law.189 The
punishment of public wrongs through the criminal law is a world apart from
the punishment of private wrongs through punitive damages.190
Because it is seeking to vindicate a different wrong, the state, acting on
behalf of society, has an interest in punishment that differs from that of the
individual victim. The state’s interest might be seen as deterrence—if it fails to
punish the offender, it encourages him to act again and others to follow in his
footsteps, placing us all at greater risk in the future. The state’s interest might
also be seen as retribution. Public retribution is typically conceived of in two
competing ways: as a mechanism for preserving equal liberty, and as a system
of ensuring just deserts.
The former vision, as Dan Markel explains, conceives of retribution by the
state as effectuating society’s commitment to equal liberty. By committing a
criminal act, an offender effectively signals that he believes he has greater
liberty than his fellow citizens—those whom he victimizes for his own gain.191
“[T]he offense is an active rebellion against the political order of equal liberty

186.
187.

188.
189.

190.

191.
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PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 147, § 2, at 9.
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 151 (1999). Sebok explains that
“[v]indication is obviously not the same thing as compensation, although one could imagine
how, under certain circumstances, the act of vindication might provide, at the same time,
compensation for feelings wounded through insult.” Sebok, supra note 99, at 200.
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (declaring
that punitive damages “serve the same purposes as criminal penalties”).
See Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1099 (“Retribution and deterrence can have different
meanings in tort law and criminal law, contrary to the Court’s assumption that these two
purposes are shared by the two bodies of law.”).
Cf. Sebok, supra note 78, at 1017 (articulating “two kinds of punishment: retribution in
public law and revenge in private law”). Zipursky makes a similar point when he argues that
“it is the plaintiff’s right to be punitive, not the system’s need to punish the defendant, that
explains the special status of punitive damages within American tort law.” Zipursky, supra
note 7, at 107. The plaintiff’s right to be punitive is the private right to seek revenge. The
system’s need to punish the defendant is the public interest in retribution.
See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 430-31 (2005).
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under law.”192 By punishing him, the state is vindicating society’s collective
interest in restoring and reinforcing the social order.
The competing vision of retribution in the criminal law is based not on the
notion that society must vindicate the rule of law and equal liberty, but rather
on the principle of just deserts: society has a moral obligation to punish
culpable wrongdoers to the extent of their desert.193 As John Rawls explains,
“It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion
to his wrong doing. . . . [A]nd the severity of the appropriate punishment
depends on the depravity of his act.”194
Under either view of the nature and role of public retribution, it is clear
that the retribution that the government seeks for the public wrong is
conceptually distinct from the retribution that the individual victim seeks for
the private wrong—revenge.195 “Formal retributive punishment,” explains
Emily Sherwin, “is inflicted in the name of the community for transgressions
of its common standards. . . . In contrast . . . revenge is based on personal
grievance arising from an injury to the avenger or someone close to him.”196
Robert Nozick has carefully distinguished public retribution from private
revenge. Nozick’s distinction is based on several characteristics, including:

192.
193.
194.
195.

196.

Id. at 433.
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91,
153-54 (1997).
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955).
“[R]evenge is personal retribution.” CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A
FORM OF JUSTICE 12 (1999). It differs from public retribution, whether the latter concept is
understood as the imposition of just deserts, see, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN 17
(2003) (distinguishing revenge from a retribution of just deserts on the ground that “[t]he
goal of vengeance is simply to provide vindictive satisfaction to victims, and victims may
require for their satisfaction something other than . . . what wrongdoers deserve”), or as a
guarantor of equal liberty, see Markel, supra note 191, at 437-40 (explaining how an equal
liberty vision of “retributive justice might usefully be contrasted with revenge”); see also
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 220, at 252 (Allen W. Wood ed.,
1991) (arguing that revenge vindicates the victim’s private interest, whereas a criminal
prosecution vindicates the public’s universal interest in justice).
Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1409; see also FRENCH, supra note 180, at 67-68 (noting that
revenge, unlike retribution, is personal); Posner, supra note 177, at 72 (“While retribution
focuses on the criminal’s wrong, [revenge] focuses on the impulse of the victim (or of those
who sympathize with him) to strike back at the criminal.”). But see OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45 (photo. reprint 2008) (1881) (arguing that retribution is
simply “vengeance in disguise”); SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE 4 (1983) (arguing that
“retribution” is “a word that affords the comfort of euphemism although it is virtually
synonymous with ‘revenge’”).
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Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the punishment,
according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally
need set no limit to what is inflicted. . . .
. . . Revenge is personal . . . [w]hereas the agent of retribution
need have no special or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for
which he exacts retribution. . . .
....
. . . Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the
suffering of another, while retribution either need involve no
emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at justice
being done. . . .
....
. . . There need be no generality in revenge . . . [w]hereas the
imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved punishment for a wrong, is
committed to general principles mandating punishment in other
similar circumstances.197
Criminal law theorists have generally focused on the importance of keeping
revenge out of the criminal law.198 No civilized government employs its

197.

198.

438

ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367-68 (1981). To this list, Markel adds
that retribution, unlike revenge, necessarily depends on the use of the power of the state and
concerns itself with the moral autonomy, dignity, and rehabilitation of the offender. See
Markel, supra note 191, at 438.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY SCARRE, AFTER EVIL: RESPONDING TO WRONGDOING 115 (2004) (noting
that most “retributivist thinkers . . . have wished to disconnect as fully as possible the
notions of justice and revenge”); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the
Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2005) (rejecting “revenge as an appropriate
justification for punishment in a liberal democracy”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of
Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994 (1985) (noting that “retaliation has received
relatively little support from philosophers or social scientists”). One occasionally sees
references to an outlier theory of retribution in the criminal law that sounds in notions of
“revenge.” But the use of the label “revenge” in this context is misleading. This theory sees
criminal punishment as vindicating a very different interest from the one served by punitive
damages as punishment for private wrongs. One version of this theory views the criminal
law as achieving revenge on behalf of society for the public wrong visited upon society. See
Henderson, supra, at 991 (noting that even if criminal retribution is viewed as revenge,
rather than moral desert, it is societal revenge, because “[s]ociety has a right to retaliate
against those who have hurt it or failed to follow its rules”); Sherwin, supra note 154, at 1409
n.93 (noting that “even formal retribution may involve collective revenge for an act that
harms society as a whole”). If the criminal law plays that role, it still redresses a collective,
societal wrong, rather than an individual, private wrong.
A related version of this theory focuses on the impulse that we all have to get back at
the perpetrator of a particularly brutal crime, even if we have no personal connection to the
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prosecutorial authority to help its citizens to extract a pound of flesh from
those who have wronged them. As George Fletcher puts it, criminal
punishment must not be about vengeance, but rather “must maintain its public
character. It is not purely a private institution. It is imposed in the name of the
People or State against actions that threaten the well-being of the entire
society.”199
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are all about private vengeance. They
are an entirely different animal.200 For this reason, I respectfully but forcefully
disagree with the claim of Redish and Mathews that “the concept of a distinct
category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’ wrongs is, at its foundation,
incoherent.”201 Criminal punishments and punitive damages are neither

199.

200.

201.

victim. See Bilz, supra note 177, at 1071 (citing scientific studies demonstrating that “people
derive satisfaction not only from foiling and avenging wrongs against themselves but foiling
and avenging wrongdoing generally”). If criminal punishment is understood to satisfy that
impulse, then it could be seen as redressing wrongs to individuals, not wrongs to society.
But it still does so on behalf of the public, not the victim; it still vindicates the collective
interest of the community in avenging the wrong, not the private, personal interest of the
victim. See Fellmeth, supra, at 23 (“[T]he fundamental value that the legal system promotes
under the revenge motive [for criminal punishment] . . . is the psychological gratification of
the public.”); cf. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 948 (arguing in utilitarian terms that
“the punishment objective derives ultimately from the pleasure or satisfaction people obtain
from seeing blameworthy parties punished”). Even if one articulates this as an “individual
vengeance rationale for criminal punishment,” Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the
Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177,
178 (1989) (emphasis added) (calling for “an individual-oriented ‘vengeance’ rationale for
criminal punishment, based on the observed visceral satisfaction felt by individuals in society
as the result of seeing a criminal punished for his crime”), it is premised on “[a]ggregated
individual vengeance”—the collective vengeance of all of the individuals in society, rather
than the vengeance of the victim alone—as the justification for the criminal law, see id. It
does not seek to use the criminal law to vindicate the unique and personal interest of the
victim. As such, it is not truly revenge. The natural impulse to avenge wrongs to others is
best labeled as “vigilantism,” rather than “vengeance” or “revenge.” BARTON, supra note 195,
at 79. Revenge, as Nozick observed, is personal; it is not the business of the criminal law.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 39 (1998); see also FRENCH, supra
note 180, at 68 (“The state does not punish the criminal for the sake of revenge, though it
can, depending on the penal theory one adopts, punish for the sake of retribution.”).
David Owen has recognized the distinction between private revenge and public retribution,
but he concludes (wrongly, in my opinion) that punitive damages do and should serve to
advance both interests. See Owen, supra note 152, at 375-77.
Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 19 n.90. In this same vein, I reject Zipursky’s
characterization of my view as based on the idea that “punitive damages [are] punishment
in the same sense as criminal punishment, only attached to a more narrowly defined act (a
‘private wrong’).” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 158. It is not the “act” that distinguishes
criminal and civil punishment; to the contrary, the same “act” often leads to both types of
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redundant nor indistinguishable, even if they are both imposed as a
consequence of the same wrongful act. They are distinct punishments for
distinct legal wrongs serving distinct punitive goals.
B. The Desirability of Punishing Private Wrongs
But is private revenge a legitimate goal in our legal system? To be sure,
revenge is a ubiquitous theme in popular culture, most visibly in western and
action hero movies.202 We, the viewers, find ourselves rooting for the wronged
character seeking revenge, and we celebrate when he finally achieves it at the
end—the colder served the better. We crave revenge in our hearts. But our
pleasure is a guilty one; in our heads, we tend to view revenge as unhealthy
and primitive.203 And thus we tend to believe that revenge should be purged
from a legal system that cherishes reason over passion.204 As Francis Bacon
long ago exclaimed, “Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s
nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.”205
We have a good reason for that impulse: “revenge as a motive for action
has no necessary connection with justice.”206 The avenger does not necessarily

202.
203.

204.

205.
206.

440

punishment. The distinction is based, rather, on the legal wrong being punished and the
goal of the punishment.
See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 180, at 3-64.
See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 195, at xiv (“Especially in contemporary Western societies,
revenge is widely thought of as being crazy, nasty, and unworthy of the aspirations of truly
civilized people, or of a civilized society. . . . Seeking justice is all very well, but it is far from
acceptable for anyone to admit that the justice they claim to seek may in fact add up to
revenge.”); JACOBY, supra note 196, at 12 (noting that the “contemporary psychiatric
approach to the question of revenge” is that “the urge to retaliate may be universal but it is
unhealthy” and thus people should give it up and rely instead on the detached retribution of
the criminal process).
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 298 (1970) (suggesting that the
notion that “the victim—or his family—has the right to see that retribution is exacted . . .
smacks . . . of revenge,” which is a “not very healthy urge to get even”); Bruce Chapman &
Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV.
741, 787 (1989) (“Retribution must not be replaced by privately motivated revenge . . . .”);
Note, supra note 181, at 522 (“A modern legal system can hardly be based on revenge . . . .”).
Leah Mervine observes that the word “vengeance” does not even appear in Black’s Law
Dictionary. Leah R. Mervine, Comment, Bridging the “Philosophical Void” in Punitive
Damages: Empowering Plaintiffs and Society Through Curative Damages, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1587,
1627 n.250 (2007). Nor does “revenge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 134.
Francis Bacon, Of Revenge, reprinted in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON pt. 2, at 384
(Routledge/Thoemmes Press 1996) (1625).
SCARRE, supra note 198, at 101.
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care whether the punishment fits the crime.207 Nor does he necessarily care
whether like cases are treated alike.208 Nor is he likely to provide his target with
a fair opportunity to explain himself—to establish his innocence, to present
evidence of mitigating circumstances, or the like. Vengeance cares not for
justice. As such, it seems incompatible with law.
But these problems with revenge are tied to its extralegality.209 If we
control revenge through the legal system—through the mechanism of judicially
constrained punitive damages—we can ensure that it is achieved in a way that
is consistent with, not defiant of, law and justice. We can ensure that the
punishment fits the offense, that like cases are treated alike, and that the
accused is treated fairly.210
In fact, allowing controlled revenge affirmatively serves the goal of justice.
Given the powerful, instinctive human impulse for revenge, affording a legal
outlet for revenge within the framework of justice helps to prevent victims
from seeking revenge outside of the framework of justice. As Holmes noted,
because “people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the
law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself,
and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution.”211 Indeed, one of the
earliest justifications for punitive damages offered by the courts was that their
availability would deter insulted victims from seeking private revenge outside
of the law.212

207.

208.
209.

210.

211.
212.

See HEGEL, supra note 195, § 102, at 130; NOZICK, supra note 197, at 367; Fellmeth, supra note
198, at 25; Posner, supra note 177, at 82 (noting “a serious deficiency in a simple vengeance
approach to punishment”—that “[t]here is nothing in the concept of vengeance . . . that
suggests a limitation on the magnitude of retaliation”).
See NOZICK, supra note 197, at 368.
See BARTON, supra note 195, at 42 (“[J]ust like any other kind of punishment, retribution,
including personal retribution, which is revenge, can be just or unjust depending on
whether the principles of justice, such as proportionality and not punishing the innocent,
are observed or violated.”).
See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 195, at 20 (discussing Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy, in which the
impulse for private revenge outside of the law is productively transformed into “the pursuit
of revenge under the constraints of law”).
HOLMES, supra note 196, at 41-42; see also, e.g., COSE, supra note 177, at 73; Owen, supra note
152, at 375.
See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (1872); Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep.
761, 761 (C.P.) (Heath, J.) (“It goes to prevent the practice of duelling, if juries are
permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages.”).
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What is more, even beyond its ability to stave off extralegal private revenge,
there is much to be said for allowing private revenge within the law.213 That is
to say, revenge is not simply an unavoidable evil that is at least less odious
when cabined within the law; it in fact serves a legitimate interest that the law
might actively pursue. Allowing punitive damages as punishment for private
wrongs vindicates the dignity of the victim.214 Sebok explains that when a
tortfeasor has committed a wrong that insults the victim’s dignity, “the
defendant violated at least two rights: The primary private right (to physical
security, property, etc.) and the right to be treated as someone deserving to
have those primary private rights respected by others.”215 Compensatory
damages redress the violation of the first right, but not the second one. The
criminal law, which is concerned only with the interests of society, redresses
neither.216 The violation of the second right can be redressed only through
punitive damages, which allow the victim to equalize her moral status with that
of her aggressor.217 Marc Galanter and David Luban refer to this feature of
punitive damages as “expressive defeat”—a public announcement of moral
equality to counteract the message of inferiority that the tortfeasor sent to, and
about, the victim by humiliating her without regard to her honor or her right

213.
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215.
216.
217.
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This point has been made by a number of theorists who seek a greater role for revenge in the
criminal law. See, e.g., BARTON, supra note 195, at xvi (arguing that, “far from revenge being
an alternative to justice, when implemented with appropriate legal and institutional
constraints, revenge is a perfectly legitimate and sometimes superior form of justice”);
FRENCH, supra note 180, at 112-229 (articulating a detailed philosophical argument that
revenge is morally legitimate—indeed, virtuous—so long as it meets the conditions of being
pursued by an appropriate person, being imposed upon a person who deserves it, and being
proportional to the offense); Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the
Victim’s Desire for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1119
(2004) (“[I]t is not immoral for a victim to want to punish his offender so as to cause his
offender to suffer; and that punishment which causes suffering is also just, so long as it is
inflicted upon the party guilty of the offense, and is proportional to the level of harm
suffered by the victim.”).
See Colby, supra note 9, at 634; cf. Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 977 (1943) (explaining that, unlike a criminal punishment, a
punitive damages award “is an authoritative vindication of the injured person’s rights”).
Sebok, supra note 78, at 1014.
But see RIPSTEIN, supra note 187, at 148 (arguing that criminal punishment redresses the
second right).
See Hampton, supra note 182, at 1686-87. Thus, Roscoe Pound once remarked that punitive
damages were appropriate because the defendant “acted as if the [plaintiff] had no right to
be considered.” Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus &
Mary, 186 N.E. 798, 799 (N.Y. 1933).
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to be treated as a morally worthy human being in possession of rights that are
entitled to respect.218
Revenge thus has value, so long as it takes place within the confines of the
law. Still, given the existence of the criminal law, it is worth asking whether
punitive damages are necessary to gain the benefits of revenge. Yes, the
criminal law technically vindicates society’s interests, rather than the individual
victim’s,219 but most victims do not know that. In an important recent article,
Kenworthey Bilz observes that victims often view the criminal law as serving
the goal of equalizing their social standing and moral worth with that of the
offender.220 That is to say, victims are willing to “delegate” their revenge to the
criminal prosecutor.221
If that is so, then perhaps there is no need for punitive damages.222 I am
inclined to disagree, however, for two reasons. First, the law cannot have it
both ways. The law cannot simultaneously defend retributive criminal justice
against charges that it is nothing more than glorified revenge223 on the ground
that it in fact serves a very different purpose, while at the same time dismissing
the need for punitive damages on the ground that the criminal law adequately
serves the purpose of facilitating revenge.
Second, as a functional matter, the criminal law often does not adequately
substitute for private revenge. Bilz notes many circumstances in which victims
are not willing to delegate their revenge to the state, or are not satisfied with
the results when they do.224 In fact, explains Bilz, victims are least willing to
step aside in favor of the state when they are the victims of crimes in which
their honor has been besmirched.225 Yet those are precisely the wrongs that call

218.

219.
220.
221.
222.

223.

224.
225.

See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1432-38. Galanter and Luban appear to view
punitive damages as serving both the individual interest in equalizing moral status through
expressive defeat and the public interest in public retribution. On my theory, they are half
right.
See, e.g., Ex parte Galbreath, 139 N.W. 1050, 1051 (N.D. 1913) (explaining that it is the
“sovereign state . . . whose dignity, alone, is sought to be vindicated” by the criminal law).
Bilz, supra note 177, at 1088-90.
See id. at 1063-64.
See Ellis, supra note 178, at 29 (noting that punitive damages may be unnecessary to placate
“the victim’s desire for vindication or vengeance” because the criminal law provides an
alternative).
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries, and the Eighth
Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with
vengeance.” (citations omitted)).
Bilz, supra note 177, at 1100-11.
Id. at 1100-05.
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for punitive damages.226 In addition, because regulatory agencies and
prosecutors are subject to capture and governmental prosecutorial resources are
limited, the criminal law will often fail to go after wrongdoers, especially the
rich and the well-connected.227 And often, even when it does go forward with a
criminal prosecution, the government will fail to obtain a conviction, thus
leaving the victim unsatisfied.228 The entire modern victims’ rights movement
is fueled by the reality that victims are routinely left unsatisfied by the criminal
process, particularly by their inability to play a central, decision-making role in
the quest for punishment; their desire for revenge, or at least for a fair shot at
pursuing revenge within the confines of the law, is not met.229
C. Constitutionality: Private Revenge and Criminal Procedure
When properly circumscribed, punitive damages are thus a desirable
feature of our legal system. But are they constitutional? Benjamin Zipursky
notes that punitive damages present something of a “constitutional puzzle”:
“[I]n a legal system that regularly cautions against elevating form over
substance, it is peculiar that there has been near-immunity [from
constitutional scrutiny] for what are openly labeled forms of ‘punishment.’”230
That puzzle deepens when we recognize that the prevailing judicial
understanding of punitive damages in recent years has been Justice Stevens’s
view of punitive damages as punishment for public wrongs. The Supreme
Court has expressed “concerns” with the risk of unfairness that arises as a
result of the fact that “defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases
have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.”231
And it has cautioned that “[g]reat care must be taken to avoid use of the civil
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See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction,
94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 53-58, on file with author), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=991865.
Of course, punitive damages plaintiffs are often unsuccessful too, and thus fail to obtain the
revenge they seek. But at least they have the satisfaction of being given the opportunity to
pursue their revenge in a legal action initiated and controlled by them. Cf. Christopher J.
Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages?, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 327, 337-38
(2008) (noting that punitive damages are uniquely able to quell the victim’s desire for
revenge because of their personal nature—because the victim is empowered to bring and
control the action).
See Eisenstat, supra note 213, at 1144.
Zipursky, supra note 7, at 106.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
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process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of
course, its higher standards of proof.”232 “Punitive damages,” it insists, “are not
a substitute for the criminal process.”233 But if they “serve the same purposes as
criminal penalties,”234 then how are they not simply a “substitute for the
criminal process?” The Court has never answered that question.
Seeking to develop a sophisticated account of the concept of punitive
damages as punishment for public wrongs, Dan Markel articulates and defends
a vision of punitive damages as vindicating the public interest in precisely the
same way that the criminal law does.235 Explicitly distinguishing them from
revenge,236 he views punitive damages as “a scheme of retributive justice
committed to condemning misconduct in the public’s name, rather than the
victim’s.”237 He thus describes punitive damages as the state’s “outsourcing” of
its prosecuting function to private parties.238 Punitive damages, he claims,
“allow[] private parties to vindicate the kinds of wrongs the criminal system
might, in a fully-funded world, pursue.”239
But Markel’s proposition would seem to make punitive damages a
“substitute for the criminal process.”240 Is it really that easy to get around the
Constitution’s mandate of heightened procedural safeguards in criminal
cases?241 The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]hose who wrote our
Constitution . . . intended to safeguard the people of this country from

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

240.
241.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Markel, supra note 227, at 48, 60. To Markel, punitive damages serve the “public’s interest in
retributive justice.” Id. at 6.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 61; see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that
punitive damages “awards act almost as a form of criminal penalty administered in a civil
court at the request of a plaintiff who serves somewhat as a private attorney general”);
Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1445; Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism
Derailed by the Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 528-31
(2005).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003).
Markel views punitive damages as an “intermediate sanction,” necessitating greater
procedural protections than compensatory damages, but fewer than criminal penalties. See
Markel, supra note 227, at 11 n.48. He plans to address constitutional concerns in an
upcoming work. See id. at 8 n.20, 67 (citing Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages
Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)).
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punishment . . . unless certain tested safeguards were observed,” such as the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against selfincrimination, and the right to be free from double jeopardy.242 If the
government can simply “outsource” its prosecuting function to private
individuals who are not constrained by those procedural safeguards, then the
Bill of Rights becomes a largely optional constraint—one that the government
can easily, and would often gladly, circumvent.243 Indeed, Galanter and Luban
profess that one advantage of punitive damages over criminal punishment is
that the lower standard of proof in civil trials ensures that more defendants will
lose their cases.244
Again, how can that be constitutional? Zipursky’s answer appears to be that
punitive damages have a “double aspect”: they simultaneously play the civil,
private law role of affording the victim a private “right to be punitive,” and the
criminal, public law role of satisfying the public’s need for retribution and
deterrence.245 That is to say, punitive damages are simultaneously punishment
for both public and private wrongs. Zipursky argues that if the private aspect
of punitive damages were to be abandoned, then they would become
unconstitutional. But so long as a punitive damages award is in some
amorphous way tied to the civil aspect of the private right to be punitive, it is
constitutional for the jury to impose punishment that is also based on the
criminal aspect of public retribution and deterrence; the fact that punitive
damages are self-consciously serving criminal goals is constitutionally
acceptable so long as they are also serving civil goals.246
That conclusion is hard to accept. If our concern is with sanctions that
serve criminal law goals without criminal procedural safeguards, then the fact
that punitive damages also serve the individual’s interest in being punitive—in
private revenge—should hardly matter. The death penalty also serves the
victim’s family’s interest in exacting private revenge, but that does not mean
that it can be imposed on behalf of society without regard to the constraints
demanded by the Bill of Rights.247

242.
243.

244.
245.
246.
247.
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United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 204, at 804-05 (arguing that, if the government
“contracts out” its prosecutorial function to private parties through punitive damages, then
criminal procedural protections should be provided).
See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1443.
Zipursky, supra note 7, at 155-59.
See id. at 155-56, 164-65, 168.
Sebok criticizes Zipursky along similar lines. See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1027.
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Zipursky attempts to ameliorate this objection by stating that a punitive
damages award that is larger than what “a reasonable juror could have
concluded the plaintiff was entitled to in light of the wrong the defendant did
to her,” or that otherwise cannot be “properly regarded as reflecting a
judgment about the plaintiff’s right to be punitive,” is unconstitutional for
failure to provide criminal procedural safeguards.248 That suggests that, at the
end of the day, the punitive damages award must be defensible solely as a
punishment for the private wrong; if it can be defended only by reference to its
criminal aspect, then it is unconstitutional.249 Still, Zipursky’s account suggests
that it is permissible to instruct the jury on the basis of the criminal aspect of
punitive damages, so long as the size of the verdict can ultimately be defended
as a civil punishment. Williams essentially rejects that assertion—that it is
constitutional to instruct the jury that it can punish for the harm done to
society, so long as, ultimately, the size of the punitive award would be
defensible as punishment only for the harm done to the plaintiff—and for good
reason. The claim that punitive damages have a “double aspect” is an insightful
descriptive account of the Court’s schizophrenic jurisprudence, but it is not a
constitutional defense of it. If punitive damages possess a “criminal aspect”—if
the legal system seeks to use them to pursue the goals of the criminal law—
then their constitutionality remains suspect regardless of whether they also
have a “civil aspect.”
So we must return once again to the fundamental question: How is it
constitutional to punish a defendant in the absence of criminal procedural
protections? The answer, I believe, is that it is not—unless the punishment is
meted out solely for the private wrong, not the public one. Substantiating that
assertion necessitates at least a brief exploration of the notoriously murky
boundary between the civil and the criminal law. Any foray into this territory is
bound to be unsatisfying. As one commentator has explained, “Despite this
importance, the Court’s numerous decisions in the area have amounted to an
incoherent muddle. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to identify an area of
constitutional law that betrays a greater conceptual incoherence.”250 Still, I

248.
249.

250.

Zipursky, supra note 7, at 168 (emphasis omitted).
In this regard, Zipursky seems at times to reject the legitimacy of the very “double aspect” of
punitive damages that he describes. If an award of punitive damages is unconstitutional if it
goes beyond the civil aspect to the criminal one, then it would seem that only the civil aspect
is permissible. See id. at 107 (“Insofar as punitive damages are basically civil, and not about
criminal punishment, they do not merit the special constitutional scrutiny afforded to
criminal defendants. Insofar as they are criminal, they do merit such scrutiny.”).
Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1998); see also Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 9-10 (describing the Court’s
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believe that enough of an answer can be teased from the doctrinal and
conceptual morass.
Over the years, commentators and courts have offered numerous proposals
for delineating the boundary between civil and criminal law. This is not the
place to recount and analyze them all. Suffice it to say that no proposal is
obviously correct, and indeed it may well be that there is no perfect answer to
be found. Perhaps there is less of a clear line than a spectrum, from the wholly
civil on one side, through a sliding scale of hybrid actions, to the wholly
criminal on the other. In fact, much of the current debate rages over the
question of whether there is or should be a set of “middle ground” sanctions
that are neither completely civil nor completely criminal in nature.251
I take no position here on that question. I seek only to offer a sensible
understanding of the ultimate line across which lies the purely criminal law,
and thus the crossing of which necessitates the provision of criminal procedural
safeguards. And I seek to offer a sensible explanation of how it is that punitive
damages can be said not to cross that line.
This explanation is one that existing proposals have trouble providing.
Consider two of the most promising possibilities. First, Galanter and Luban
argue that a sanction can be criminal only if the prosecuting party is the state,
rather than a private individual.252 That line might explain why punitive
damages do not warrant criminal procedural protections. But it is conceptually
problematic, especially when it comes to punitive damages. Galanter and
Luban defend their line on the ground that the Bill of Rights is premised on
the “fear [of] the power of the state . . . . to eliminate its political enemies,” and
they assert that “these special concerns do not really implicate punitive
damages.”253 The conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise.
Zipursky explains,
Galanter and Luban treat private plaintiffs as those to whom the state
has delegated enforcement power—in effect, as private attorneys

251.
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253.
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decisions in this area as “nothing less than a jurisprudential Frankenstein’s monster,” and
“as incoherent as any in the Court’s jurisprudence”).
Compare Mann, supra note 132 (arguing for the explicit recognition of middle ground
sanctions), with Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997) (arguing against intermediate
sanctions).
See Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1456.
Id. at 1457; see also Klein, supra note 145, at 691 (arguing that punitive damages fall on the
civil side of the line because “the framers wished to protect individuals from the
government, not from private parties and juries of their peers”).
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general. The problem with this is it undercuts the idea that
constitutional norms should not apply. If the private plaintiffs are
really delegees of state power, then the awesome power of the state is
being used, albeit in a decentralized way.254
Second, Henry Hart argues that “[w]hat distinguishes a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”255 A criminal
sanction is “a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community.”256 Employing this distinction, commentators have argued
that punitive damages are civil and do not necessitate the safeguards of
criminal procedure because they do not impose the stigma of moral
condemnation that accompanies a criminal penalty.257 Regardless of whether
this is a sensible line, however, it would seem that punitive damages actually
fall on the criminal side of it. After all, the Supreme Court itself has declared
that a “jury’s . . . imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral
condemnation.”258
An alternative ultimate line between the criminal and the civil law—one
that offers a solution to the “constitutional puzzle” of punitive damages—is
that, to be criminal, a sanction must be punishment for a public wrong. This is
essentially a two-part test. The sanction must both be punishment and be
intended to redress a wrong to society.

254.

255.
256.
257.
258.

Zipursky, supra note 7, at 146 (citation omitted); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996) (“State power may be exercised as much by a jury’s application of a
state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.” (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265 (1964))); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 298
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A governmental entity
can abuse its power by allowing civil juries to impose ruinous punitive damages as a way of
furthering the purposes of its criminal law.”); Mann, supra note 132, at 1814; Zipursky, supra
note 7, at 149.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, in CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 61, 64-65
(Abraham S. Goldstein & Joseph Goldstein eds., 1971).
Id. at 65.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 121, at 410-11.
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); see also JOEL
FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98-99, 104 (1970) (embracing Hart’s theory but noting that
punitive damages are a form of expressive condemnation); Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of
the Criminal Law: Toward a “Regulatory Model” of, or “Pathelogical Perspective” on, the CivilCriminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 200 (1996) (noting that the moral
condemnation model does not distinguish punitive damages because “[p]unitive damages
are welded to moral condemnation”).
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Zipursky and Sebok doubt this line and its applicability to punitive
damages. They do not see why the mere fact that punitive damages are
punishment does not necessitate criminal procedural protections, regardless of
whether they punish public or private wrongs. As Zipursky puts it,
“punishment of private wrongs is still punishment, and it is therefore hard to
explain why constitutional scrutiny appropriate to criminal punishment should
apply to punishment of public wrongs but not to punishment of private
wrongs.”259 Echoes Sebok, “it is hard to see why [Colby’s] argument does not
cut against his preferred theory of punitive damages as private punishment as
much as the theory he attacks—punitive damages as public punishment.”260
After all,
punishment of private wrongs is still punishment. Colby does not
explain why, for instance, punishment of Jones by Private Citizen
Smith for the wrong of stealing $10,000 would not be constrained by
the same constitutional limits as punishment of Jones by the State of
New York for larceny. . . . Why would due process not constrain
Smith as a punisher in the same way that it constrains New York as a
punisher?261
I will endeavor here to explain, first by reference to the case law. The
Supreme Court has held that criminal procedural safeguards do not apply to all
“sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.”262
Rather, they apply only to “criminal punishments.”263 The Court generally
defers to the legislative (or presumably common law) label of a sanction as
criminal or civil, but “[e]ven in those cases where the legislature has ‘indicated
an intention to establish a civil penalty, [it has] inquired further whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,’ as to ‘transform
what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”264 That
inquiry is guided by the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez265:
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260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

450

Zipursky, supra note 7, at 142.
Sebok, supra note 78, at 1005.
Id. at 1004.
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); Rex Trailor Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.266
These various factors will often point in different directions; the question is
whether, considering them as a whole, they strongly contradict the legislative
(or common law) civil label.267
Because it has relied on history to avoid the constitutional inquiry, the
Supreme Court has never subjected punitive damages to this test. But Justice
O’Connor once observed that it is “easy to conclude that punitive damages are
penal under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.”268 After all, they are and have
historically been regarded as punishment; they only come into play on a
finding of scienter; courts consistently speak of them as promoting the
traditional aims of punishment (retribution and deterrence); they are quite
often imposed for behavior that is also a crime; and the Supreme Court has
conceded that, rather than serving some alternative purpose, they “serve the
same purposes as criminal penalties.”269
So then why do punitive damages not trigger criminal procedural
protections? The answer is that Justice O’Connor was right: they do trigger
those protections if they are understood as punishment for public wrongs, as they
generally were at the time that Justice O’Connor was writing. But they do not
trigger them if they are understood as punishment for private wrongs. The
Mendoza-Martinez factors play out very differently if punitive damages are
limited to punishment for private wrongs. When they are so limited, the last

266.
267.
268.
269.

Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 168-69).
See id. at 101.
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 298 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). See generally Grass,
supra note 106, at 245-313 (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to punitive damages); id.
at 247 (“[T]he conclusion is inescapable that they are penal in nature, spirit, and
jurisprudence, and thus mandate higher standards of procedural protection.”).
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two factors come into play: there is an alternative, noncriminal purpose for
them, and they are carefully limited to fulfilling that purpose. And the other
factors also apply very differently to punishment for private wrongs. The
Mendoza-Martinez formulation is misleading, insofar as it focuses on
punishment simpliciter without explicitly incorporating the original test for
determining whether a sanction is “penal” in the way that would bring it across
the civil/criminal line. In Huntington v. Attrill, the Court held that “[t]he test
whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the wrong
sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual,
according to the familiar classification of Blackstone.”270
Nearly a century ago, the Court relied on that principle in a case that held—
in an unusual context—that punitive damages are not penal within the
meaning of the Huntington test. O’Sullivan v. Felix271 involved a civil rights
action brought by a man who was beaten by two other men in a successful
effort to keep him from exercising his right to vote. The question for the Court
was whether the action was time-barred, which depended on whether or not it
was a penal action. If it was, then a longer federal limitations period applied.272
The Court explained that the federal civil rights laws in question provided for
both “criminal proceedings and punishment for the public wrong, and actions
in law or equity for the redress of any private injury.”273 The Court found it
“very clear that the public wrong is punished by the fines and punishment
prescribed” and “the private injuries inflicted are to be redressed by civil
suit.”274 Citing Huntington, the Court concluded that the fact that the plaintiff
demanded punitive damages stemming from the “signs of the degradation and
humiliation placed upon him”275 was of no matter. Those damages were

270.
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146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 9 (2001) (quoting the Huntington
test as a lead-in to the Mendoza-Martinez factors); Hall, supra note 214 (recognizing that the
distinction between civil and criminal law is based primarily on the fact that the former
seeks to remedy individual harm and the latter seeks to remedy social harm); cf. Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (holding that when a contempt sanction operates as
punishment for “a public wrong,” it is a criminal sanction and necessitates criminal
procedural protections). See generally supra note 134 (noting that the law treats the terms
“crime” and “public wrong” as synonymous).
233 U.S. 318 (1914).
See id. at 322.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 321.

392.COLBY.479.DOC

12/22/2008 1:18:43 PM

clearing the smoke from philip morris v. williams

intended to redress the private wrong to him, not the public wrong to society,
and thus his action was not penal and was accordingly time-barred.276

276.

To be fair, O’Sullivan may not be quite as clear a precedent as the text implies. In
Huntington, the Court had explained,
In the municipal law of England and America, the words “penal” and “penalty”
have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment,
whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or
offense against its laws. But they are also commonly used as including any
extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered.
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1892) (citations omitted) (citing United States
v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880)). When it declared that whether a law is “penal”
depends on whether it seeks to redress a public or a private wrong, the Huntington Court
explained that it was using “penal” in “the strict and primary sense,” as opposed to the
“commonly used” sense. Id. at 667-68. In citing Huntington, however, the O’Sullivan Court
ran the two senses of “penal” together: “The term ‘penalty’ involves the idea of punishment
for the infraction of the law, and is commonly used as including any extraordinary liability
to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the
damages suffered.” 233 U.S. at 324 (citing Huntington, 146 U.S. at 666, 667; Chouteau, 102
U.S. at 611).
It is possible to read O’Sullivan as not addressing the “strict and primary” sense of
“penalty” at all, but rather as holding merely that the action was not “penal” even in the
“commonly used” sense, because it did not involve “extraordinary liability,” but instead was
“limited to the damages suffered.” But the Court emphasized that the plaintiff sought
“damages in the sum of $25,000 ‘for the wounding less than mayhem,’ $25,000 ‘for the
humiliation, degradation and public ridicule,’ and $10,000 ‘as punitive and exemplary
damages.’” Id. at 325. Insofar as they were sought as a supplement to the compensatory
damages for the physical injury and the “humiliation, degradation and public ridicule,” it is
clear that the punitive damages were intended to go beyond compensation for the damages
actually suffered. Immediately after defining the term “penalty” and citing Huntington, and
immediately before listing the damages prayed by the plaintiff, the O’Sullivan Court gave
the reason for its holding: “It is very clear that the public wrong is punished by the fines and
punishment prescribed [by the criminal law], that the private injuries inflicted are to be
redressed by civil suit, and the amount of recovery is determined by the extent of the injury
received and the elements constituting it.” Id. The punitive damages went beyond
compensation for the injury suffered, but they were still designed to redress, and
“determined by the extent of,” that private injury—rather than the public wrong to society.
See Colby, supra note 9, at 619, 639-40 (explaining that it was understood historically that,
as punishment for private wrongs, “the proper amount of punitive damages depends on the
severity of the injury to the plaintiff”). That is why they were not “penal.” See also JamesDickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1927) (“Exemplary damages
are recoverable at common law in many States. A statute providing for their recovery by and
for the injured party is not a penal law [in the strict and primary sense].” (citing Huntington,
146 U.S. at 666-83)); Gruetter v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 F. 248, 250-54 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1909) (stating that an action brought not to “remedy . . . any public wrong, but
merely for punitive damages for the breach of a common-law obligation or private wrong” is
“essentially civil in its nature” and is not penal within the meaning of Huntington);
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The Huntington line also explains the Court’s general failure to afford
criminal procedural protections to so-called civil penalties—penalty provisions
in civil statutes. The Court has insisted, often through the operation of legal
fictions, that these penalties are not punishment for public wrongs. This
insistence goes all the way back to Blackstone, who included actions for
statutory penalties in his volume on private wrongs, rather than his volume on
public wrongs, on the theory that they are simply damages for the breach of
the implied contract that every member of society makes with the King.277 It is
admittedly difficult to see why a breach of that contract is a private wrong,
rather than a public one, but Blackstone’s theory appears to be that the wrong
was not visited upon the public order of the community, arousing fear and
disorder in the public sphere, but rather was simply a breach of a private
obligation to live up to the rules laid down by the government. The “victim” of
that breach is the government, not society as a whole. The Supreme Court has
employed similarly dubious fictions in upholding the constitutionality of
various civil penalties, such as treble damages in antitrust and administrative
penalties in environmental laws.278 The Court often finds, for instance, that the
civil penalty is in reality simply a form of rough compensation to the
government for the cost of enforcing the law, rather than an attempt to
penalize the defendant for violating the law, and thus the penalty is really
remedial, and is not punishment at all.279
The Court’s use of dubious legal fictions in the civil penalties arena may
not be particularly satisfying, and I make no effort to defend it. When it comes
to punitive damages, however, there is either no need to employ similar legal
fictions, or no opportunity to do so. As punishment for private wrongs,
punitive damages really do serve a very different goal from the one that triggers
criminal procedural safeguards. No fiction is necessary. But if punitive
damages are punishment for public wrongs, then by definition they fall on the

277.
278.
279.
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S. Ry. Co. v. Decker, 62 S.E. 678, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (explaining that the fact “that the
damages are punitive does not render the statute which prescribes them penal” unless they
are imposed for the purpose of “vindicating the public justice of the state”).
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at *158-61; Mann, supra note 132, at 1820-21.
See Mann, supra note 132, at 1802, 1820-36.
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (finding that
treble damages in antitrust are “in essence a remedial” sanction); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) (holding that qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act are civil because “[w]e cannot say that the remedy now before us requiring
payment of a lump sum and double damages will do more than afford the government
complete indemnity for the injuries done it”); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531, 547
(1871) (finding that private civil actions seeking double or treble damages are compensatory,
not penal); Mann, supra note 132, at 1823-30.
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criminal side of the line—they are the very definition of a criminal sanction. At
that point, no fiction is possible; once we concede that they serve the same
purpose as criminal sanctions, it is too late to come up with some sort of
dubious legal fiction to avoid the Bill of Rights.
The Constitution thus mandates that, absent criminal procedural
safeguards, punitive damages may be employed as punishment for private
wrongs, but not as punishment for public wrongs. The Court therefore
reached the proper result when it held in Williams that procedural due process
demands that punitive damages may not be imposed to punish the defendant
for harm caused to anyone other than the private, individual victim before the
court.280
The boundary between criminal and civil law that I have set out and the
conclusion that punitive damages fall on one side of the line when punishing
private wrongs, and the other side of the line when punishing public wrongs,281

280.

281.

Of course, this conclusion does not apply when punitive damages are accompanied by
criminal procedural safeguards. This Article does not consider the feasibility of imposing
those safeguards in civil lawsuits. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127 (2005) (requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for punitive damages). I hasten to add that the mere fact that a
sanction falls on the criminal side of the line does not necessarily mean that the full panoply
of criminal procedural safeguards must attach. The law has long recognized that minor
criminal penalties can be imposed in the absence of some constitutional safeguards. See, e.g.,
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) (holding that a jury trial is not required for petty
criminal offenses); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886) (holding that a grand
jury indictment is required only for “infamous crimes”—those punishable by
imprisonment). Thus, even though they are criminal in nature, awards of punitive damages
(or other civil sanctions) that serve as punishment for public wrongs might not necessitate
the full scope of criminal procedural safeguards, but would certainly trigger significantly
greater procedural protections than are required when punishing private wrongs.
This does not mean that punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs raise no
constitutional concerns. The Court has been forced by the language of the Bill of Rights—
many clauses of which apply only to “criminal” cases—to draw difficult lines and to hold on
to a criminal/civil distinction that many legal theorists believe to be formalist and
anachronistic. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 196, at 44 (announcing that “the general
principles of criminal and civil liability are the same”); David Friedman, Beyond the
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103, 108-12 (1996) (arguing that the distinction
between crime and tort is simply the product of historical accident). But the Constitution
does not necessitate a degree of formalism that rises to the level of fundamental unfairness.
Civil procedure may not be limited by the various criminal procedural protections of the Bill
of Rights, but it is limited by the Due Process Clause. And due process necessitates
heightened procedural protections for many noncriminal punitive sanctions. See Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102-03 (1997) (noting that even if a sanction is not criminal, its
abusive potential is curbed by other constitutional provisions like the Due Process Clause).
As such, the argument in this Article casts no doubt on the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
imposing procedural and substantive limits on punitive damages. It may, however, call into
question Mark Geistfeld’s suggestion that the constitutional limits imposed by the Court’s
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are not only consistent with the admittedly murky doctrine, but also make
good theoretical sense.282 As Zipursky explains, punishment for private
wrongs—which he calls the plaintiff’s private right to be punitive—is
“importantly different from an exercise of the state power to punish” or from
“the state authorizing an individual to carry out the state role of punishing.”283
It allows the plaintiff to vindicate her personal, private interests. It is not an
end run around the Bill of Rights—a conscription of the plaintiff to do the
state’s dirty work without having to play by the rules imposed on the state by
the Constitution. As Zipursky writes,
The state might be happy about the consequences of such an award,
and might even maintain its regime in part because of these recognized
consequences. But if the state is imposing punitive damages out of
respect for a right of private redress, then the reasons for providing
criminal procedural protections are not necessarily implicated.284
The Framers included criminal procedural protections in the Bill of Rights
because they “fear[ed] the power of the state . . . to coerce and repress. They
fear[ed] that the state will use that power to eliminate its political enemies, as

282.

283.
284.
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pre-Williams punitive damages cases are likely applicable to other aspects of tort law,
including pain and suffering damages. See Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1101-12; see also BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). On my reading,
those cases are best grounded in the fact that, unlike pain and suffering damages, punitive
damages are punitive (albeit not criminal). See, e.g., Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-36 (2001) (emphasizing the similarities between the Court’s
punitive damages cases and its criminal sanction cases).
Of course, if the Court were to take the line that I am advocating seriously, that decision
would have implications extending beyond the realm of punitive damages: many ostensibly
civil sanctions would be on tenuous constitutional footing. But those sanctions are already
on tenuous constitutional footing. My line poses no greater threat to the current civil
sanctioning regime than does the standard Mendoza-Martinez formulation, the full
implications of which the Court has chosen to avoid through the use of legal fictions. If the
Court wishes to continue to employ its legal fictions, it can explicitly endorse the proposed
line without undermining other civil sanctions. Even if the Court were to purge its civil
sanction jurisprudence of legal fictions, it is possible that many civil penalties might
genuinely be justifiable on nonpunitive or private interest rationales. Those that could not
would indeed have to be abandoned (or accompanied by heightened procedural safeguards),
but doing so might not threaten the efficacy of the administrative regulatory state as much
as one might fear. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds Between
Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901 (1992) (arguing that heightened procedural
protections might not undermine the use or efficacy of civil administrative penalties).
Zipursky, supra note 7, at 153.
Id. at 156.
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almost every state in human history has done.”285 When punitive damages are
used to vindicate the state’s interests, they implicate those fears. When they are
used to vindicate purely private interests, they do not.286
D. Deterrence: The Elephant in the Room?
The foregoing explains the retributive role of punitive damages. We are
left, however, to grapple with the concept of deterrence. Courts, including the
Supreme Court, have long maintained that “[p]unitive damages may properly
be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition.”287 The Williams Court began its analysis

285.

286.

287.

Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1457; see also Dripps, supra note 258, at 204-05 (noting
that the political origins of the criminal procedural safeguards in the Bill of Rights can be
found in the Enlightenment desire to prevent the government from using its power to
disable political opposition or to maliciously victimize members of politically unpopular
groups); Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 25 (“[T]he Bill of Rights was adopted primarily to
protect citizens against the threats posed to their civil liberties by a state, motivated by
ephemeral political forces, that may be less solicitous of those rights.”); id. at 31-34 (arguing
that the enhanced procedural protections of the Bill of Rights are needed only when the
state, because its interest is directly at stake in the proceeding, has an incentive to abuse its
power to punish the defendant).
Redish and Mathews argue that punitive damages are unconstitutional because they
represent a “[d]irect vindication of the public interest [which] must be deemed a purely
public power,” and due process precludes the transfer of public power to private individuals.
Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 3-7, 13, 19. Whatever its merits may be, that argument
is premised on the notion that punitive damages are punishment for public wrongs. Redish
and Mathews focus on “the wholly punitive, and therefore purely public, nature of punitive
damages,” id. at 4, and argue that “when a private plaintiff furthers the public interest by
collecting what amounts to a civil fine, that plaintiff is no longer pursuing his own private
interest but rather is doing nothing more than effectively acting as an agent of the state,” id.
at 16; see also id. at 33 (arguing that punitive damages “represent nothing more than a
financial inducement to have these plaintiffs enforce the coercive power of the state”). As
punishment for private wrongs, however, punitive damages are designed to vindicate
private interests, not public ones. Of course, they still benefit the state in a number of ways.
See generally Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good Is Served by the Remedy of Punitive
Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1997) (discussing the public benefits of punitive damages).
But the mere “fact that punitive damages benefit the public interest does not mean that the
point of the practice is to serve public ends.” Sebok, supra note 78, at 1035. And so long as
their purpose is to serve private, not public ends, they cannot be unconstitutional for the
reasons offered by Redish and Mathews. Indeed, Redish and Mathews admit that
compensatory damages in tort also serve ends desired by the state, but they conclude that
the fact that compensatory damages at the same time serve valuable private ends is sufficient
to sustain their constitutionality. See Redish & Mathews, supra note 123, at 49-50. The same
must be true of punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (emphasis added).
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with a de rigueur recounting of that basic proposition—that punitive damages
serve the goals of both punishment and deterrence.288 But then it never
mentioned deterrence again; it focused only on punishment.289 What are we to
make of that omission? One can easily imagine a situation in which the
retributive punishment for a relatively minor private wrong to the plaintiff
would be insufficient to deter the defendant and others from engaging in
similar wrongdoing in the future. That is especially likely to be the case when
the defendant profits from imposing relatively minor harms on many victims,
only a small number of whom are likely to bring successful lawsuits. If any
punitive awards are limited only to the amount necessary to avenge the
moderate harm to the individual plaintiff, a rational defendant might well
conclude that the expected profits still outweigh the expected damages and
might continue to engage in the wrongdoing.
Some commentators have speculated that perhaps Williams essentially
rejected the traditional deterrence rationale for punitive damages, leaving only
the retributive one.290 At the opposite extreme, other commentators have
suggested that perhaps Williams addressed only the retributive role of punitive
damages, not the deterrent one, and thus still allows the jury to punish the
defendant for harm to others, so long as it is done in the name of deterrence,
rather than retribution.291 As I shall explain shortly, however, Williams need
not be read to be either so radical292 or so inconsequential.
But first, consider a third possibility: that Williams was wrongly decided—
and that my theory of punitive damages is erroneous—for failing to take into
account the proper role of deterrence in punitive damages law. That is the

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
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See 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007).
See Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 365 (2008).
See id.; Hubbard, supra note 56, at 378, 382.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 72, 74
(2007) (implying this possibility).
That the Court has not abandoned the deterrence rationale for punitive damages is clear
from its opinion in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), decided a year after
Williams. Exxon is an atypical punitive damages case because the Court was exercising its
maritime jurisdiction “in the manner of a common law court,” id. at 2619, and thus was
“reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit
allowed by due process,” id. at 2626. Still, even though the maritime common law
excessiveness inquiry “precedes and . . . obviate[s] any application of the constitutional
standard,” id., the Court made clear that it was articulating its general “understanding of the
place of punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process in
administering punitive law,” id. at 2620; see also id. at 2634 n.28 (noting that the Court’s
analysis “may well” govern the constitutional inquiry). Deterrence concerns weighed very
heavily in the Exxon Court’s analysis. See id. at 2621-22, 2625, 2628, 2633 & n.27.
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argument of Akhil Amar and Arthur McEvoy, who claim that “Colby argues
that courts have always conceived of exemplary damages ‘as punishment for
the private legal wrong—the insult—done to the individual plaintiff,’” and then
reject that argument as “flawed” because it ignores the long history of judicial
recognition of the legitimate deterrent goal of punitive damages.293 Although
Amar and McEvoy make an important point, their objection does not take
them as far as they want to go.294
The Supreme Court’s occasional references to punitive damages as serving
the twin goals of “punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”295
are, as Judge Posner has explained, “cryptic, since deterrence is a purpose of
punishment, rather than, as th[at] formulation implies, a parallel purpose,
along with punishment itself, for imposing the specific form of punishment

293.

294.

295.

Brief of Akhil Reed Amar and Arthur McEvoy as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
9 n.10, Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256) [hereinafter Amar and McEvoy Brief]
(quoting Colby, supra note 9).
To be clear, I do not mean to claim that courts always viewed punitive damages as
punishment for private wrongs. My historical claim is that, when they understood punitive
damages as punishment, courts traditionally viewed them as punishment for private wrongs,
not public ones. I must be careful not to overstate even that claim. There is at least one case
in which “punitive damages were not just levied to punish the harm done to a single
plaintiff, but to the entire society.” Rustad, supra note 239, at 475. In McBride v. McLaughlin,
5 Watts 375 (Pa. 1836), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared, “There are offences
against morals to which the law has annexed no penalty as public wrongs, and which would
pass without reprehension did not the providence of the courts permit the private remedy to
become an instrument of public correction.” Id. at 376. The McBride court opined that “no
other principle” can explain damages above the level necessary for compensation than that
their true purpose is to punish the wrong to society. Id. It specifically rejected the notion
that the damages might be explained as vindicating the resentment of the victim, declaring
that the “purposes of the law are more elevated than the gratification of revenge.” Id. at 37677. But later in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania changed course
(in a case that, unlike McBride, raised double jeopardy concerns because the defendant’s
conduct was also punishable as a crime) and held that punitive damages punish only private
wrongs to individuals. See Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 393-94 (1878). Similarly, the high court
of Mississippi once declared that it is the “duty” of the jury in cases in which “the law
provides no other penalty” to impose punitive damages as “proper punishment for the
disregard of public duty,” in “the interests of society.” New Orleans, Jackson & Great N.
R.R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660, 666 (1859). But that court subsequently reversed course
and declared that, although they serve “the public good, by deterring the offender and
others from like offenses,” the “imposition of [punitive] damages is not for the purpose of
punishing an offense against the public justice, but rather to afford redress to the person
injured.” Louisville & N.R. Co. v. McCaskell, 53 So. 348, 349 (Miss. 1910); see also Colby,
supra note 9, at 620 & n.130 (noting that some early courts found that allowing punitive
damages when the defendant’s conduct was also punishable as a crime was inconsistent
with double jeopardy principles).
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
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that is punitive damages.”296 Deterrence is not distinct from punishment; it is
rather one of the two principal goals of punishment, the other being
retribution. Thus, the Court is more accurate when it employs the formulation
that punitive damages are imposed as punishment “for purposes of retribution
and deterrence.”297
It follows that the notion that punitive damages must be punishment for
private wrongs, rather than public ones, incorporates the notion of deterrence.
If deterrence is a purpose of punishment, and if the state cannot engage in
punishment to serve the public good without criminal procedural safeguards,
then it follows that the state cannot employ punitive damages to achieve the
public benefits of deterrence without affording criminal procedural safeguards.
Constitutionally, whether they seek retribution, deterrence, or both, punitive
damages may punish only for private wrongs.
Amar and McEvoy are surely correct that early courts at times spoke of
punitive damages as serving the societal goal of deterrence.298 To the extent
that my prior work failed to make that sufficiently clear, it was admittedly
incomplete.299 But those early courts tended to view punitive damages as
vindicating public interests, rather than private ones.300 Amar and McEvoy
might have also cited Bishop v. Stockton, in which the court declared that
“exemplary damages may be given to indemnify the public for past injuries and
damages, and to protect the community from future risks and wrongs.”301
Once courts began to confront the constitutional obstacles to using
punitive damages to vindicate society’s interests, however, they backed away

296.

297.
298.

299.
300.

301.
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Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 329 (1998) (“Deterrence . . . has traditionally been viewed as a goal of
punishment . . . .”).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
Sebok explains, however, that claiming that most of these cases stand for the proposition
that “exemplary damages served a deterrence rationale” paints “too crude and hasty a
picture of the meaning of exemplary damages.” Sebok, supra note 99, at 202-03. In fact, to
most of these early courts, “the point of such damages was not to prevent similar acts by
allowing future wrongdoers to weigh the cost of their wrongdoing, but to use the past
wrongdoing as an opportunity for the community to frame a norm.” Id. at 203. This was
more of an “expressive use of punishment” than a deterrent one. Id. Sebok explains that a
genuine deterrence rationale was surprisingly rare in nineteenth-century cases. Id.
But cf. Colby, supra note 9, at 636, 668-70 (discussing the deterrent role of punitive
damages).
See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 493 (C.P.) (rejecting the argument of
the Solicitor General that “a private action [cannot be] represented as the cause of all the
good people of England”).
3 F. Cas. 453, 455 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.W.D. Pa. 1843) (No. 1440).
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from that rationale, as my prior work makes clear. Amar and McEvoy concede
that their historical analysis “do[es] not consider cases founded on
retribution.”302 That exclusion is difficult to justify when seeking to determine
whether punitive damages can be used to punish the defendant for the harm
done to third parties or to society. Deterrence and retribution are two sides of
the punishment coin; the recognition in the retribution cases that the
defendant cannot be punished for public wrongs had significant implications
for the constitutional role of deterrence. Amar and McEvoy fail to cite or even
to acknowledge the existence of the many nineteenth-century cases that treated
punitive damages as punishment only for the private wrong to the
individual.303 Nor do they address the crucial fact that the courts so held in the
course of justifying the existence and constitutionality of punitive damages.304
One cannot properly assemble a puzzle if one leaves half of the pieces in the
box.305
When courts began to recognize that punitive damages must vindicate
private interests rather than public ones, they began to downplay the deterrent
purpose of punitive damages. Consider, for instance, Wardrobe v. California
Stage Co., a stagecoach accident case in which the California Supreme Court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because the jury had been charged that it
could give punitive damages “such as would be an example thereafter, which
would tend to prevent such recklessness in the conduct of stages to the great
peril of passengers.”306 The court found this instruction “obnoxious” because it
“devolves upon the jury the duty of punishing the defendants for what the
Court seems to consider an offense to society, and by inflicting a penalty upon
them, securing, by force of the example, future safety for the public.”307 The
court explained that the plaintiff could not act as “a public prosecutor, to
vindicate the wrongs of the community; he was not the medium through

302.
303.
304.
305.

306.
307.

Amar and McEvoy Brief, supra note 293, at 3.
See Colby, supra note 9, at 614-29.
See supra Part III.
Indeed, any puzzle that could be pieced together using only the deterrence cases would not
match the picture on the box. As I have explained, the fact that punitive damages were
understood as punishment for private wrongs explains many features of historical and
current punitive damages doctrine—such as the rule that punitive damages may be awarded
only when the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for an underlying tort, and the rule that the
amount of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of
compensatory damages—that appear nonsensical under a view of punitive damages as
serving society’s interest in deterrence. See Colby, supra note 9, at 637-43.
7 Cal. 119, 120 (1857).
Id.

461
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which these rights were to be asserted or maintained.”308 He could recover
punitive damages beyond mere compensation for his injuries, but he could not
recover damages that “are professedly laid for the benefit of the public.”309
Over the course of the nineteenth century, as they came to recognize that
punitive damages exist to vindicate private interests, not public ones, the courts
began to view the deterrent effect of punitive damages as merely a happy side
effect of their primary role as private revenge.310 The standard judicial
pronouncement was that “[e]xemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages are
such as blend together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual,
and are not only a recompense to the suffering, but also a punishment to the
offender and an example to the community.”311 In other words, by punishing
the private wrong to the victim, punitive damages achieve a deterrent effect
that benefits all of society, but that public benefit is merely an incidental effect
of the private punishment–and an unavoidable one at that. As the Iowa
Supreme Court explained,
It is claimed by defendant’s counsel that, in civil cases, damages ought
to be limited to the extent that will operate alone upon the offender as
a punishment, and a restraint of his future conduct; the example to
others ought to be kept out of view. This is impossible, because, in all
cases of punishment, the example will reach and affect the public.
There cannot be a punishment without an example; the two are
inseparable. If punishment be administered so there will be no
example for the good or ill of the public, it ceases to be punishment.312
But punitive damages “are never allowed alone for the purpose of public
good through the example given in their assessment”; rather, “[t]he effect
upon the public is but an incident” of the private punishment.313 In other

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
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Id.
Id.
Cf. MURPHY, supra note 195, at 17 (arguing that when punishment is imposed as vengeance,
deterrence is simply an accidental byproduct).
Fla. Cent. & Peninsular R.R. v. Mooney, 24 So. 148, 150 (Fla. 1898).
Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa 686, 688 (1875).
Id.; see also Watts v. S. Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901) (“[P]unitive damages go to
the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty for a public wrong, but in vindication of a private right
which has been willfully invaded; and, indeed, it may be said that such damages in a
measure . . . satisfy for the willfulness with which the private right was invaded, but, in
addition thereto, operating as a deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning
to others.”).
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words, public deterrence is an unavoidable (albeit perfectly desirable) result of
punitive damages as punishment for private wrongs, but it is not and cannot be
the driving force behind them. The jury cannot calibrate the damages by
reference to the societal benefits of deterrence, and a punitive damages award
that exceeds the appropriate level of retributive punishment for the private
wrong cannot be justified on the ground that it is necessary to achieve the
societal benefits of deterrence. To do so would be to convert it into a form of
unconstitutional punishment for public wrongs.
There is, however, more to be said in favor of deterrence, even under a
private revenge model of punitive damages. The fact that it is inappropriate to
use punitive damages to serve society’s interest in deterrence does not mean that
deterrence is a wholly impermissible goal. Just as punitive damages are
appropriate to satisfy the individual victim’s private interest in retribution—
revenge—so too are they appropriate to satisfy the individual victim’s private
interest in deterrence. The victim clearly has an interest in ensuring that the
defendant does not victimize her again.314 Thus, if a punitive damages award
calculated by reference to her interest in individual revenge is not sufficient to
deter the defendant from continuing to place her at risk of future harm, then it
would be appropriate to increase the award even further.315 In that limited, but
nonetheless significant,316 respect, I agree with Amar and McEvoy that
deterrence is and has always been a legitimate use for punitive damages.317 That

314.

315.

316.
317.

See, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886) (noting that a plaintiff may recover
“exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his right and protect it against future similar
invasio[n]s”).
In doing so, however, the jury (and reviewing court) should focus only on the individual
harm to the plaintiff. It should set the penalty at the amount that will ensure that the
expected sanction for the wrong to the plaintiff (the total amount of punitive and
compensatory liability multiplied by the likelihood that the private wrong would be
successfully detected and prosecuted) exceeds the expected profit from the wrong to the
plaintiff. This calculation is unaffected by whether the defendant actually harmed anyone
else; it seeks only to ensure that it will not be profitable for the defendant to wrong the
plaintiff again. See Geistfeld, supra note 125, at 301-02. To set the penalty with regard to
actual harm to others, and the likelihood that the defendant will escape liability for it, is to
impermissibly punish for the harm to nonparties. See Colby, supra note 9, at 668-71.
Although this notion of deterrence is limited to the individual’s interest, not society’s, it
“can sometimes yield very high punitive damages.” Colby, supra note 9, at 669.
I disagree, however, that punitive damages may be used to completely “deter . . . others . . .
from similar conduct in the future.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
That might be a welcome side effect of punitive damages, but it cannot be a driving force
behind them without violating procedural due process. See Galligan, supra note 10, at 126
(observing that my theory is inconsistent with this claimed purpose of punitive damages).
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interest was not at play in Williams, however, insofar as the individual victim
was deceased and thus no longer at risk of harm.318
What is more, as Part V explains, if extracompensatory damages awards are
divested of any pretense to punishment, Williams does not stand in the way of
their use to achieve a different sort of deterrence.
E. Evidence of Harm to Others To Determine Reprehensibility: The Exception
that Swallowed the Rule?
Thus far, I have sought to establish that punitive damages may not be used
to punish the defendant (in the name of retribution or deterrence) for the harm
caused to nonparties. Williams reached the correct result, albeit with
inadequate reasoning. But what then to make of the Williams Court’s
declaration that, even though the jury may not punish the defendant for
harming third parties, it may nonetheless consider that harm “in order to
demonstrate reprehensibility”?319 Commentators have tended to agree with the
Williams dissenters that that distinction is so elusive as to be nonsensical.320
The problem is that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, which Williams purports to follow, the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the “most important” factor in
determining the appropriate size of the punitive damages award.321 Williams
says that juries should consider harm to others in determining the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and that juries should base the size
of the punitive damages award on that degree of reprehensibility, but that
juries cannot “use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on
account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.”322 Is that not
inherently contradictory? One commentator illustrates the absurdity with a
proposed jury instruction:

318.

319.
320.

321.
322.
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See Geistfeld, supra note 125, at 266-67. Geistfeld suggests that the interest in private
revenge similarly is not at play in wrongful death actions. See id. at 272-73. But an individual
has a strong dignitary interest in ensuring that her wrongful death will be avenged—every
bit as much of an interest as she has in ensuring that her family or her estate will be
compensated for the injury causing her death.
127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007); see supra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Allen, supra note 289, at 359; Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip
Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 31 (2007); Kmiec, supra note 56.
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
127 S. Ct. at 1064.
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are permitted to consider injury
to nonparties to determine the level of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct; however, you may not consider injury to
nonparties when determining the amount of punitive damages to
assess. The most important factor in determining the amount of
punitive damages to assess is the level of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct.323
On its face, that does indeed appear to be absurd. And the opinion only
makes things worse when it declares that it is appropriate to consider harm to
others in the name of reprehensibility because “[e]vidence of actual harm to
nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public.”324 This passage suggests
that punitive damages awards can be used to redress the wrong to society by
punishing the defendant for the harm that it caused—or threatened—to the
general public, which is inconsistent with the notion that punitive damages
must punish only private wrongs. And, as I have endeavored to demonstrate,
the notion that punitive damages may punish only private wrongs is essential
to the ultimate conclusion in Williams that it is unconstitutional to use punitive
damages to punish the defendant for the harm to nonparties. So once again,
the Court’s reasoning seems contradictory and absurd.
Still, I believe that here, too, the Court essentially reached the correct
result, albeit on the wrong rationale. Harm to others can be considered, in a
limited way, in determining the reprehensibility of the wrong, and hence the
amount of punitive damages—but not for the reason stated by the Court.
The reprehensibility inquiry does not examine the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct in the abstract. Rather, once we recognize that punitive
damages may serve as punishment only for the private wrong to the plaintiff, it
follows that the only “reprehensibility” that matters is the reprehensibility of
the private tort—the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongful
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. Whether the defendant’s conduct harmed or
threatened harm to the general public is generally irrelevant to the
reprehensibility of the private wrong; it is relevant only in determining the
reprehensibility of the public wrong, which is not at issue in punitive damages
cases. Still, if the fact that the defendant also harmed other individuals

323.

324.

Daniel Sulser Agle, Comment, Working the Unworkable Rule Established in Philip Morris:
Acknowledging the Difference Between Actual and Potential Injury to Nonparties, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 1317, 1355.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
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illuminates the degree of reprehensibility of the wrong done to the plaintiff,
then it might be relevant and admissible in a punitive damages case.325 Michael
Rustad offers a classic example in the case in which a jury “punished a
television manufacturer for failing to take prompt remedial steps after it
learned that its television sets caused a series of home fires.”326 Rustad worries
that the “admissibility of the other house fires caused by spontaneous
combustion of the defective components would be questionable after
Williams.”327 But it should not be. The evidence of previous, known harm to
others helps to demonstrate the reprehensibility of the decision to go ahead
and sell the defective product to the plaintiff.328 It is therefore admissible, but
only for this purpose.329
Seen in this light, the Williams exception is both sensible—the
reprehensibility of a tort often cannot be adequately ascertained in a vacuum—
and workable. If evidence of harm to others is admitted, the jury can and must
be instructed that it can consider that evidence only to the extent that it aids in
ascertaining the degree of reprehensibility of the individual wrong done to the
plaintiff alone. The jury must be told that its job is to punish the defendant
only for what it did to the plaintiff; it may not seek to punish the defendant for
the harm that it caused to anyone else.

325.
326.
327.
328.

329.

466

See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1032.
Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme Court and Me: Trapped in Time with Punitive Damages, 17
WIDENER L.J. 783, 823 (2008) (citation omitted).
Id. at 823-24.
To give another example, if the defendant vandalized the plaintiff’s property, evidence that
the defendant does that sort of thing all the time could make his intentional disregard of the
plaintiff’s rights appear more reprehensible than would evidence that he had been trying to
impress new friends by following through on a dare, and had never done anything like this
before in his life. See Colby, supra note 9, at 667 (“[A] wrongful refusal to pay benefits due
under an insurance policy would be more reprehensible—and thus deserving of greater
punishment—if it were a part of a nationwide and company-wide practice of victimizing
elderly or otherwise vulnerable insureds than it would be if it were simply the result of an
isolated act of wrongdoing by one unsavory employee.”). One imagines that, in many
contexts, the fact that the defendant harmed only the plaintiff would make the private
wrong more, rather than less, reprehensible. Plaintiff’s counsel would be free to argue that
the fact that the defendant treated every other customer with dignity and respect, but
singled out the plaintiff alone for abuse, makes the disregard of the plaintiff’s human dignity
all the more reprehensible because it suggests that the wrongdoing was not simply an
indiscriminately employed unsavory business practice—it was a personal slight.
And, of course, a trial judge should exercise caution in ensuring that the probative value of
such evidence is not outweighed by its potential for prejudice.
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v. future: the end of law and economics?
What implications does Williams have for the future of punitive damages?
On one reading, it essentially does nothing to change the practice of punitive
damages on the ground. Because the jurors can still hear evidence of harm to
others, any attempt to cabin what they do with that evidence through jury
instructions will be futile, and they will go on imposing total harm punitive
damages.330
I am skeptical of that assertion. A properly instructed jury should be able to
see the difference between punishing the defendant for harming thousands or
millions of victims, and considering harm to others only to provide the context
necessary to determine the reprehensibility of the defendant’s disregard of the
individual plaintiff’s rights. Specifically telling the jurors that they must punish
the defendant only for what it did to the plaintiff, and that they are strictly
forbidden from seeking to punish the defendant for what it did to anyone else,
should lead to very different results in many cases. That is especially likely to
be the case when accompanied by a rule that precludes plaintiff’s counsel from
making arguments about the appropriate punishment for injuring or killing
thousands of people.331 In addition, reviewing courts will be more aggressive in
striking down awards that would be reasonable as punishment for the full
societal harm, but are excessive as punishment for the individual tort. Williams
will, I believe, make a real difference. It will put an end to total harm punitive
damages.332
But does it go too far? As a matter of retribution, I do not believe so.
Williams allows the plaintiff to seek individualized revenge, which is the only
retributive interest that can and should be at play in a civil lawsuit.

330.

331.

332.

See Sebok, supra note 78, at 1033 (suggesting that there will only be a “miniscule practical
effect of adopting [Williams’s] semantic distinction” between directly punishing harm to
nonparties and considering that harm in determining reprehensibility); Insurance Companies
Heart Williams Case, TortsProf Blog, Feb. 21, 2007, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
tortsprof/2007/02/insurance_compa.html (“I would wager it will make exactly zero
difference in the outcome.”); cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92
MINN. L. REV. 83, 150-53 (2007) (arguing that Williams will not preclude total harm punitive
damages in environmental cases).
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003) (noting that
the plaintiff’s attorney told the jurors that they were “going to be evaluating and assessing,
and hopefully requiring State Farm to stand accountable for what it’s doing across the
country, which is the purpose of punitive damages”).
Cf. Goldberg, supra note 125, at 7-8 (arguing that a private punishment view of punitive
damages will tend to yield substantially lower awards than a public punishment and
deterrence conception).
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Deterrence, however, may be a different story. The law and economics
approach to punitive damages argues that punitive damages should serve as an
engine of optimal deterrence; they should be used to ensure that the defendant
internalizes the full social cost of its behavior. Compensatory damages are
frequently insufficient to achieve that goal, insofar as defendants often escape
liability for some of the harm that they cause. A rational actor might therefore
engage in economically inefficient behavior—behavior that imposes more costs
than benefits upon society—because it knows that it will receive the full
benefits of the behavior, but will likely only be forced to bear a small portion of
the costs. The object of punitive damages, on this view, is to ensure that
potential wrongdoers understand that, even if they will escape compensatory
liability for some of the harm that they cause, they will still be forced to
internalize the full scope of the cost of their conduct through punitive damages
awards. As such, they will have the proper incentive to engage in the behavior
only to an economically efficient degree, and will expend appropriate resources
to avoid causing harm (but only to the extent that the cost of the harm exceeds
the cost of avoiding it).333
I have previously argued that, under this model, total harm punitive
damages pose a serious risk of overdeterrence—of discouraging socially
beneficial conduct.334 But perhaps eliminating them and focusing only on the
private wrong to the individual victim will result in underdeterrence—that is,
will fail to discourage socially harmful conduct. The risk of underdeterrence
should not be overstated; as noted above, the deterrent potential of
punishment for private wrongs is actually quite substantial.335 Still, it is quite
possible that punishing only the private wrong will have the effect of
underdeterring in many circumstances, such as in wrongful death actions,
when the victim no longer has a private interest in deterrence that can be
considered in assessing punitive damages.
One imagines that some state legislatures (or state courts) might seek to do
something about that.336 Taking the advice of law and economics scholars, they
might want to create an extracompensatory sanction designed to achieve
optimal deterrence by ensuring that the defendant fully internalizes the costs of
its behavior.

333.

334.
335.
336.
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See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 40-58 (1990); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 877-96;
Sharkey, supra note 9, at 365-70.
See Colby, supra note 9, at 612 n.98.
See supra Section IV.D.
See Sharkey, supra note 9, at 414-28.
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A number of commentators have opined that Williams forecloses the states
from doing so.337 That view is certainly understandable if one accepts the
Williams reasoning on its face. Ensuring that the defendant internalizes all of
the social costs of its activity turns the focus to the harms allegedly visited upon
nonparties, which Williams appears to preclude.338 But if one accepts the thesis
of this Article—that ultimately Williams must rest on the principle that it is
unconstitutional to punish for public wrongs without criminal procedural
safeguards—then the issue looks very different.
The cost-internalization sanction favored by the law and economics school
seeks to serve the public good, rather than to vindicate a private tort right of
the plaintiff. Indeed, it seeks to fix the sanction by reference to “the total harm
caused” by the defendant339—“the harms inflicted by the defendant upon
parties not before the court,” including both “‘specific harms’ to identifiable
individuals, and more ‘diffuse harms’ that affect society in general.”340 That
sanction is certainly “quite similar” 341 to the total harm punitive damages that I
have argued are unconstitutional, and that Williams has struck down. But it is
not the same thing, and the distinction makes all the difference.342

337.

338.

339.
340.
341.
342.

See Allen, supra note 289, at 368 (finding it “unlikely” that the optimal deterrence rationale
for punitive damages “survived Philip Morris”); Hubbard, supra note 56, at 384 (arguing
that, in the line of cases culminating in Williams, the Court has used “the Due Process
Clause to deny a state the right to apply these widely accepted theories in adopting an
approach to deterrence”); Hylton, supra note 320, at 17-21; Rustad, supra note 8, at 499-501;
Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Punitive Damages
Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 52-53,
on file with author); Paul B. Rietema, Recent Development, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery
Statutes: Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct 1057 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1159, 1166 (2008) (“By prohibiting consideration of third-party harm, the Court has, under
the guise of the Due Process Clause, mandated an individual-oriented punitive
framework. . . . [S]tates may no longer use punitive damages to encourage socially optimal
deterrence as traditionally conceived—where the focus is on creating full internalization of
harm in a world of partial enforcement . . . .”).
Similarly, if the result in Williams is grounded, as other defenders of the decision would
have it, in the civil recourse principle—that tort remedies may not be employed for the
primary purpose of serving public regulatory goals, see supra note 125 and accompanying
text—then the law and economics model fails for shifting the focus from the victim’s
interests to society’s. See also supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of
Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews).
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
Sharkey, supra note 9, at 392.
Anthony J. Sebok, Deterrence or Disgorgement? Reading Ciraolo after Campbell, 64 MD. L.
REV. 541, 566 n.126 (2005).
For an initial discussion of the difference between cost internalization and total harm
punitive damages, see Colby, supra note 9, at 612 n.98.
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This Article has sought to explain that, in order to be criminal in nature
and thus to necessitate criminal procedural protections, a sanction must not
only seek to redress the harm to society; it must seek to punish the defendant
for the harm to society. It must be a form of punishment. As such, the fact that
cost internalization takes into account the harm to others to serve the public
interest does not make it criminal, unless it is also a form of punishment. Of
course, at first glance, it might appear that it is indeed punishment. It is
imposed in the name of deterrence, which, as noted above, is a goal of
punishment.343 But the matter is not quite so simple. Although it is often
averred that “when it comes to deterrence, civil and criminal remedies are
essentially indistinguishable and interchangeable,”344 in fact, properly
understood, the deterrence sought by civil remedies is distinct from the
deterrence sought by criminal ones.345
How to articulate that distinction is a matter of some dispute. Mark
Geistfeld opines that the distinction has to do with whom the remedy seeks to
deter. A remedy that seeks “specific deterrence”—deterrence of the defendant
alone—is civil, but a remedy that seeks “general deterrence”—deterrence of
others besides the defendant—is criminal.346 Thomas Galligan draws the line
in the same terms, but reaches the very opposite conclusion: a remedy that
seeks specific deterrence is criminal, but a remedy that seeks general deterrence
is noncriminal.347 John Coffee, by contrast, draws the civil/criminal line not on
the basis of the identity of the person or persons that the remedy seeks to
deter—the defendant alone or all other potential wrongdoers—but rather on
the basis of the level of deterrence sought—whether the sanction seeks to deter
the activity completely, or merely to ensure that the defendant engages in it
only to a socially optimal degree.348 Along those lines, Keith Hylton explains
that the “traditional notion of deterrence in the criminal punishment literature
is one of ‘complete deterrence,’ of stopping offenders from committing

343.
344.

345.
346.
347.
348.

470

See supra Section IV.D.
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1355 (1991).
See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421,
421 (1998).
Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1096-99.
Galligan, supra note 10, at 148.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1884 (1992).
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offensive acts.”349 By contrast, the “alternative, more recent notion of
deterrence, largely observed in the torts literature, is that of ‘appropriate or
optimal deterrence,’ which implies deterring offensive conduct only up to the
point at which society begins to lose more from deterrence efforts than from
the offenses it deters.”350
It is my position that, in fact, the line between civil and criminal deterrence
turns on both of these factors. Again, because criminal penalties punish public
wrongs, criminal deterrence must both be punishment and be intended for the
good of society. It is a two-prong inquiry, and each of these factors addresses a
different prong.
The first question is whether the deterrence is punitive. This inquiry turns
on the degree of deterrence sought. Optimal deterrence does not necessarily
seek to prevent conduct. It merely seeks to ensure that an actor who engages in
the conduct employs the proper safety precautions and engages in it only to an
optimal degree. Thus, when society’s gain from the actor’s conduct is greater
than society’s loss, an optimal deterrence regime allows the actor to keep doing
it, so long as he pays for any harm that he causes along the way. Despite the
fact that it causes harm, we want him to keep doing it because society derives a
net benefit from his activity.351
As Kenneth Simons explains, in an optimal deterrence regime, the actor “is
entitled to harm the victim so long as he pays for the harm (with the
expectation that this entitlement will induce him to take optimal care),”
whereas in a complete deterrence regime, the actor “is not entitled to harm the
victim even if [he] is willing to pay for that harm.”352
Optimal deterrence is not a punitive concept.353 Society does not “punish”
someone for doing something that it affirmatively wants him to do.354
Complete deterrence, however, is punitive. The goal of punishment, when it is
imposed in the name of deterrence, is to prevent wrongful conduct—to deter it

349.
350.
351.
352.

353.
354.

Hylton, supra note 345, at 421. This concept is often referred to as “classical deterrence.” Id.
at 421 n.1.
Id. at 421; see also Galligan, supra note 333, at 8-10 (noting the difference between these two
forms of deterrence).
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 882.
Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273
(1996); see also Coffee, supra note 348, at 1876 & n.6 (explaining that this
pricing/prohibition distinction can be expressed as the difference between optimal and total
deterrence).
See Galligan, supra note 10, at 129.
See supra note 185 (noting that the concept of punishment implies the commission of an
offense).
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completely.355 Punishment seeks to ensure that persons will not engage in
conduct, regardless of whether it produces more benefits to the wrongdoer (or
to society) than harm to others. Punishment forces the wrongdoer to disgorge
the full amount of his gain to prevent him from having a perverse incentive to
keep doing something that the law considers to be inimical to the public
interest, whether it is efficient or not.356
A sanction that seeks complete deterrence is thus a punitive sanction, but
that does not mean that it is a criminal sanction. That depends on the second
question: whether it seeks primarily to serve the public interest of society or the
private interest of the plaintiff. That is the inquiry that turns on the identity of
the person or persons sought to be deterred. General deterrence (of the
defendant and everyone else) is designed to serve the public interest in
regulating behavior. Specific deterrence (of the defendant alone) is designed to
serve the private interest in vindicating the plaintiff’s tort right.

355.
356.
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See Hylton, supra note 345, at 423 (“The goal of punishment should be complete
deterrence.”).
See Hylton, supra note 320, at 15. The distinction between optimal and complete deterrence
is not without its conceptual problems. At one level, complete deterrence could be thought
of as simply an application of optimal deterrence. After all, as Judge Easterbrook has noted,
“[t]he optimal amount of fraud is zero.” Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir.
1991). But of course, actually achieving a fraud level of zero might only be possible by
imposing penalties so high that actors will over-invest in prevention, such that the costs
invested in avoiding the fraud exceed the costs that the fraud would have imposed. Indeed,
if the penalties for fraud were high enough, actors might avoid engaging altogether in any
socially beneficial activities that carry with them even a slight risk of fraud liability. In that
regard, perhaps no legal sanction—not even a punitive one—should be truly interested in
complete, as opposed to optimal, deterrence. Indeed, in his seminal economic analysis of the
criminal law, Gary Becker proposed an optimal deterrence—rather than complete
deterrence—model of criminal punishment. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 198-99 (1968). That has not, however, been the
traditional understanding of the criminal law. See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties
and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 176 (2005) (noting that “criminal
law adopts a policy of prohibition; it does not seek to constrain murder, theft, or rape to
‘optimal’ levels”); id. at 176 n.4 (noting that Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham endorsed
the notion that the criminal law should completely deter). One way to conceive of the
distinction between optimal and complete deterrence is that complete deterrence is sought
for practices that society would, in an ideal world, like to eliminate altogether (even if the
realities of enforcement costs and marginal deterrence make that goal unachievable and
perhaps even undesirable in practice), whereas optimal deterrence is sought for practices
that society has no particular desire to eliminate altogether, so long as they remain
economically efficient. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 41-43 (arguing that the
pricing/prohibition distinction ultimately turns on society’s moral judgment of the
behavior).
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Of course, the plaintiff also has an interest in general deterrence in the
sense that she does not want to get hurt by someone other than the defendant
either. But any interest that she has in avoiding being harmed by others is one
that she shares equally with everyone else in society. The interest that she has
in avoiding repeated harm at the hands of the defendant, by contrast, is unique
to the relationship between the two of them; it is a part of the private tort right
that she seeks to vindicate in the civil action that she has filed against him.
By the same token, society also has an interest in specific deterrence in the
sense that it wants to ensure that the defendant is adequately deterred. Yet
society’s interest in deterrence is necessarily broader. Why would the public
have an interest in ensuring that one person does not act (or that he engages in
an activity only to an optimal degree) but not care whether and to what extent
anyone else engages in the same harmful activity? If a remedy is seeking
specific deterrence, aimed at the defendant only, then it must be targeted
primarily at the individual victim’s interests, not society’s.
Thus, a sanction imposed in the name of deterrence is criminal in nature
and necessitates criminal procedural safeguards only if it seeks complete and
general deterrence. That is precisely the end sought by punitive damages as
punishment for public wrongs: ensuring that neither the defendant nor anyone
else357 will ever engage in this activity again,358 even if the conduct is
economically efficient. The Supreme Court has explained that the prevailing
modern understanding of punitive damages is premised on the notion that
“‘[c]itizens and legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate
some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally
offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct.’”359
But a sanction that seeks complete and specific deterrence—like punitive
damages employed as punishment for private wrongs—is not criminal.360 And
a sanction that seeks optimal deterrence is not punishment, and thus is not
criminal regardless of whether it seeks to regulate the behavior of the

357.

358.

359.
360.

See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (declaring that one of the
purposes of punitive damages is “protecting the public by [deterring] the defendant and
others from doing such wrong in the future” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 n.4 (1991) (noting that
“punitive damages . . . clearly are intended to prohibit, rather than price”); Galligan, supra
note 333, at 9 n.7 (noting that, when courts speak of the deterrent function of punitive
damages, they are referring to complete deterrence through punishment).
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001) (quoting
Galanter & Luban, supra note 175, at 1450).
See supra Sections IV.C-D.
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defendant only (specific deterrence)361 or the behavior of all other actors in
society (general deterrence).
The law and economics vision of punitive damages as an engine of cost
internalization falls into the last category. It seeks to regulate broadly—to serve
societal interests through general deterrence362—but it seeks only optimal
deterrence, not complete deterrence.363 The law and economics movement has
long understood that much behavior that causes great harm also brings even
greater benefits, and thus must not be prohibited.364 The object of cost
internalization is simply to ensure that individuals or parties engage in such
behavior to an optimal degree, with optimal efforts to reduce the costs that it
imposes. Law and economics scholars have accordingly insisted that their
model of punitive damages is not really “punitive” at all,365 and that their
sanction should be imposed regardless of the mental culpability of the
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Dan Dobbs argues that punitive damages should be adapted to play the role of ensuring
specific, optimal deterrence, and he correctly notes (without elaboration) that adapting
them to this end would neutralize the argument that they should not be awarded without
criminal procedural safeguards. See Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive”
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 854-56, 858-59 (1989).
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 877 (“By deterrence, we mean what is often called
general deterrence, namely, the effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on
the behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (not just on the behavior of the
defendant at hand).”).
See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring);
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 954. Keith Hylton disagrees with other law and
economics scholars when he argues that punitive damages generally should seek complete
deterrence, not simply cost internalization. See Hylton, supra note 320, at 15. As such,
Williams—as I seek to reconstruct it—bars the states from adopting his recommendation.
Most of the other law and economics scholars who have analyzed punitive damages have
concluded that sometimes, when the defendant’s behavior is sufficiently morally
reprehensible, it might be appropriate to seek complete deterrence rather than optimal
deterrence. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 909-10, 920 (arguing that, when
an individual defendant’s benefit from the conduct was purely malicious, in the sense that it
was derived from the fact of causing the harm, then the sanction should aim for complete
deterrence). As Judge Calabresi acknowledges, however, that “function of punitive damages
renders them analogous to criminal penalties that seek not to achieve a socially optimal level
of activity, but to discourage or even eliminate a particular activity altogether,” at which
point “it would be appropriate to reconsider the procedural protections that should attach
before such an award can be made.” Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 n.8.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 1-3 (1985) (discussing
automobiles).
See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Galligan, supra note 333, at 13;
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 890-91; Sharkey, supra note 9, at 389-90.
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defendant.366 If one were to run the cost internalization sanction through the
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors,367 it would clearly come out as
noncriminal: it is not labeled as punishment; it is not regarded as punishment
by those who advocate it; it does not come into play only on a finding of
scienter; it does not promote the traditional goals of punishment—retribution
and complete deterrence; it applies to conduct that is not necessarily criminal;
and it is carefully targeted to serve an alternative, nonpunitive purpose.368 It is
thus not a criminal sanction, and the Williams decision should not be read to
preclude it.369 Justice O’Connor once wrote, in discussing punitive damages,
that “‘[j]ust as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics,’ it does not require us to adopt the views of the Law and
Economics school either.”370 But at the same time, it does not prohibit us from

366.
367.
368.
369.

370.

See Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 (Calabresi, J., concurring); Galligan, supra note 333, at 62-63;
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 125, at 874.
See supra text accompanying note 266.
Cf. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980) (noting that a sanction can be
nonpenal—noncriminal—if it has a “correlation to any damages sustained by society”).
Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.13 (2001)
(noting that if a state were to adopt a damages remedy that seeks optimal economic
efficiency, a different constitutional analysis would apply); Calabresi, supra note 23, at 339
(noting that, when punitive damages seek only cost internalization, “as no semi criminal law
objectives are at play, there is no reason to impose procedural safeguards”); Coffee, supra
note 348, at 1883 (arguing that a penalty that goes beyond cost internalization is
“‘punishment’ (in the constitutional sense),” whereas a “penalty equal to the social cost of
the behavior can be described as nonpunitive,” and thus “the full constitutional safeguards
applicable to criminal prosecutions need not apply”); Fellmeth, supra note 198, at 54-55, 59
(arguing that a “deterrent” sanction that necessitates criminal procedural protections is one
that leads to complete deterrence, rather than one that allows the defendant to pay for the
harm that it causes while continuing to engage in harmful behavior); Galligan, supra note
10, at 149-150 (noting that, even if the Supreme Court in Campbell adopted the theory that
punitive damages may not punish public wrongs, it did not necessarily signal the end of
punitive damages as an engine of optimal deterrence, since they would be nonpunitive);
Sharkey, supra note 9, at 401 (“By reconceptualizing these underdeterrence damages as
societal compensation, as opposed to quasi-fines or penalties, the societal damages approach
would seem to survive the retributive-punishment-focused due process constraints of State
Farm . . . .”). For this reason, I disagree with Zipursky’s conclusion that cost internalization
“really fall[s] on the criminal side of the divide,” Zipursky, supra note 7, at 141, and with
Sebok’s conclusion that cost internalization is a form of “punishment” or “penalty” that is
ultimately subject to the same due process constraints that apply to traditional punitive
damages, Sebok, supra note 341, at 547-49, 569.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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adopting the views of the law and economics school.371 Williams does not stand
in the way of implementing an extracompensatory remedy that seeks optimal
deterrence.372
Even so, Judge Calabresi, a champion of cost internalization, is unsatisfied.
In a thought-provoking recent essay, he argues that punitive damages can
serve, and often have served, a variety of “very different functions,” and he
explains that “each function, if it were the sole object of such
extracompensatory damages, would have rules and limits that make no sense if
one examines punitive damages through the prism of a different function.”373 It
may be perfectly sensible for an academic to adopt a single, unified model of
punitive damages, he says, but for a court to do so is “foolishness”374:
What may well be right from a unidimensional and reductionist view
of a torts problem, what is the basis of a very helpful and deep analysis
by a scholar like Colby, what may even be correctly seen—as Colby
asserts—as the historical origin of punitive damages in America,

371.

372.

373.
374.
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At least not for the reasons that underlie Williams. I take no position here on whether costinternalization damages raise other constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 7,
at 141-42, 148 (suggesting that even nonpunitive, noncriminal regulation through private
tort actions can raise constitutional problems). Nor do I opine on whether Catherine
Sharkey’s intriguing proposal to create “societal compensatory damages”—damages that
seek to ensure both cost internalization and the compensation of other victims (and society
more generally), see Sharkey, supra note 9; cf. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 247 (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (making a similar proposal)—might be unconstitutional for other reasons,
despite their noncriminal nature. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate
Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2004) (outlining several potential due process
objections to awarding societal compensatory damages based on injuries to absent parties);
cf. Colby, supra note 9, at 592-602 (noting the potential for unfairness that such a remedy
would need to avoid).
One might speculate that, as a practical matter, it would be impossible for reviewing courts
to ascertain whether extracompensatory damages were awarded in the name of optimal
deterrence, rather than complete deterrence (and/or public retribution). A state could,
however, easily implement the law and economics sanction in a way that would leave no
doubt on the question. A state seeking to do so could (and should) drop the “punitive” label
altogether, abandon the scienter requirement, preclude jury argument based on notions of
retribution or complete deterrence, and instruct the jury pursuant to a law-and-economicsinspired multiplier formula. Indeed, the jury instructions could explicitly inform the jurors
that their task is not to punish, or to stamp out the activity, but simply to ensure that the
defendant absorbs all of (but nothing more than) the cost of the harm that it causes.
Calabresi, supra note 23, at 336.
Id. at 346; see also David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781,
792 (1996) (opining, before Campbell and Williams, that “courts have shown a good deal of
wisdom to resist academic categorizations urging singular normative bases for punitive
damages”).
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becomes dangerously wrong when applied across the board as a
matter of constitutional necessity by a torts-ignorant Court to a
multidimensional and complex set of problems!375
While the rule that punitive damages may not redress harm to nonparties
makes sense when punitive damages are understood as a form of punishment,
it becomes “dangerous, and almost silly, if one accepts the possibility that the
common law of any given state may have had some or all of the other rationales
‘in mind’ when it developed its own rules and limits on punitive damages.”376
Judge Calabresi’s point is well taken, but it can, I think, be answered. As
the foregoing discussion of the cost-internalization sanction makes clear, the
fact that the Court has placed appropriate limits on genuinely punitive damages
does not mean that the states may not choose to adopt (or continue in effect)
nominally “punitive” damages that are in fact designed to serve other,
nonpunitive functions. In other words, contrary to the objections of critics,
Williams does not constitutionalize the view of punitive damages as
punishment for private wrongs.377 Rather, it simply takes off the table one of
the many possible uses for punitive damages—punishment for public wrongs.
The states are free to adopt (or continue in effect) other forms of
extracompensatory damages that serve one or more alternative goals; they
simply need to make clear that these damages are not a form of impermissible
punishment and to make sure that they are never used as one.
Judge Calabresi recognizes this, but he believes that there are substantial
costs to forcing the states to do so: “[I]n the end a society may . . . be better
served by the retention of multipurposed, somewhat inconsistent concepts.”378
Punitive damages have traditionally served many purposes at once, have
unconsciously promoted additional values as well, and have even served goals

375.
376.
377.

378.

Calabresi, supra note 23, at 346. Judge Calabresi was writing before Williams but was of the
opinion that the Campbell Court had already adopted my position. See id.
Id.
But see Allen, supra note 289, at 364-65 (“[B]y framing the issue as one of federal
constitutional law, the Court has made it practically impossible for any entity other than
itself—state or federal—to change this stunted conception of punitive damages.”); Rustad,
supra note 239, at 464 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court is forcing the states into a
common mold based upon an individualistic retributory jurisprudence bypassing the
multiple functions of punitive damages that have evolved over two centuries of AngloAmerican jurisprudence.”).
Calabresi, supra note 23, at 347.
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that we secretly desire but do not want to admit to openly.379 To force the
states to spell out the exact purpose and function of punitive damages is to
force them to give up these benefits. Judge Calabresi believes that it is
wrongheaded and unduly disrespectful of state sovereignty for the Supreme
Court to require them to do so.380
In the abstract, I am agnostic on the relative advantages of, on the one
hand, mandating the clarification of muddled doctrines and, on the other
hand, allowing the blurring of doctrinal rationales in order to serve varied and
perhaps even conflicting interests—although I am inclined to defer to Judge
Calabresi’s wisdom and experience here.381 And I wholeheartedly agree with
Judge Calabresi that this choice should ordinarily be one for the states to make;
the Supreme Court should generally butt out of the common law. But in this
particular instance, I believe that the Constitution forces the Court’s hand. By
way of analogy, if a state imposed a poll tax that had come to serve the
purposes of both raising money and precluding the poor from voting, that tax
would be unconstitutional.382 The fact that, in part, it served a legitimate
interest—revenue raising—would not save it. The state would remain free to
raise revenue in a different way, through a different tax that did not violate the
Constitution. But it would be incumbent upon the courts to force the state to
disentangle the constitutional from the unconstitutional.
So, too, here. In most states, there is no doubt that punitive damages are
used primarily as punishment. That is how the plaintiff’s lawyer explains them
to the jury.383 That is how the trial court instructs the jury.384 And that is what

379.

380.
381.

382.
383.
384.
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See id. On this last point, Judge Calabresi has in mind what he calls the “tragic choices”
function of punitive damages: the self-contradictory fact that we generally want
manufacturers to make efficient cost-benefit analyses in determining how much to invest in
product safety, but at the same time we do not want to allow them to defend against liability
on efficiency grounds when their products tragically cause injury or death. See id. at 340-43.
See id. at 348.
For an argument contrary to Judge Calabresi’s, see Geistfeld, supra note 23, at 1115-16, which
argues that when the Court imposes constitutional limits that are premised on a particular
conception of the nature of tort liability, the states can get around those requirements by
explicitly grounding their tort law in a different conception, and thus the Court’s decisions
“can serve the valuable role of forcing state courts and legislatures to identify more clearly
the substantive objectives of tort liability.”
See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring a poll tax
unconstitutional).
See Colby, supra note 9, at 584 & n.3.
See id. at 610.
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tends to drive the jury’s verdict.385 They are, after all, called punitive damages.
The constitutional implications of that reality cannot be avoided by the fact
that they might on other occasions, or even simultaneously, serve other goals—
goals that the states are free to continue to pursue once they disentangle them
from punishment. The states are free to maintain extracompensatory remedies,
even muddled ones that simultaneously serve any number of state interests, so
long as one of those interests is not the punishment of public wrongs. Williams
was thus correctly decided, notwithstanding its interference with the
traditional role of the states in shaping the law of torts. Tort law—like all law—
is constrained by the Constitution.386
conclusion
Although its reasoning was incomplete and at times misguided, the
Supreme Court ultimately got it right when it held in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams that the Constitution prohibits the use of punitive damages to punish
a defendant for harm caused to persons not before the court. To punish the
defendant for the wrong done to the plaintiff is to vindicate the plaintiff’s
private interest in revenge—a legitimate goal of the civil law. To punish the
defendant for the total harm visited upon all of society, by contrast, is to
vindicate the public’s interests in retribution and complete deterrence. Those
interests, however, are the province of the criminal law, and the Constitution
does not allow the state to outsource their vindication to private parties in an
end run about the procedural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants by
the Bill of Rights. This Article argues that that is the true justification for the
Court’s holding in Williams, and it suggests that one consequence of that fact is
that Williams does not stand in the way of implementing a law-andeconomics-inspired cost-internalization sanction that is not a form of
punishment and thus does not implicate the concerns of the criminal law.

385.

386.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 70, 73, 134 (2002)
(concluding based on empirical research that retribution drives juries’ punitive damages
awards); Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 72-73 (1998)
(concluding, based on empirical research, that the size of a punitive damages award
generally depends on the jury’s retributive intent). For an example of the extent to which
juries view punitive damages as a form of genuine punishment, see Arnett v. Fuston, 378
S.W.2d 425, 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), in which the jury concluded, “We declare L. D.
Fuston guilty of the charge and recommend a judgment of $30,000.00 against him and
punitive damages from one to five years in prison.”
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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